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The Puzzling Lack of Cooperatives
Peter Molk*
Some ofthe most ecognizable companies, icludng Land O'Lakes, REZ the Associated
Pass, Ace Hardware, and State Farm nsurance, arm organzedas coopemtives-firms owned by
their suppliers, workers, or customers. Yet aside from isolated arras of the economy
cooperatives constitute only a small portion of Amencan enterpnse which is otherwise
dominated by investor-owned inms Conventional wisdom assumes that irms either start as
cooperatives or convert to cooperatives when cooperatives offer the highest ongoing benefits to
owners, and it explains the lack of cooperatives by suggesting that cooperatives usually do not
maxinie ongoing benefits.
This Article looks at entpreneus' and brokers' actions when siarting or converting
finms. It fmds that the conventional assumption is oaften violated Starting a cooperative is
similar to supplying a publc good andjust as unsubsidized public goods are underprvided so
too are unsubsidzed cooperative starts Additionaly a lack of viable bokerng institutions
prevents most existing firms from converting to cooperatives even when cooperatives pronise
the hghest ongoing benefits These findgs explain cooperatives'lowmarket share and several
empircal observations that are iconsistent with the conventional wisdom. The results suggest
social welfare could be improved if cooperatives were subsidzed through favorable tax
tratmen4 grants, or regulatory intervention like ABA rules requirng law frms to be owned by
lawyers. They also question the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance The
Article closes by briefly considerng the Affordable Care Actk current $2 billion subsiation of
health insurance cooperatives
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I. INTRODUCTION
Land O'Lakes. Sun-Maid Raisins. Ocean Spray. REI.
Vanguard. State Farm Insurance. Northwestern Mutual. Ace
Hardware. The Associated Press. The makers of Gore-Tex. What do
these organizations have in common? All are pillars of American
enterprise operating in diverse sectors of the economy. All are
cooperatives.'
1. Our Story, LAND O'LAKEs, http://www.landolakes.com/OurStory/ (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014); About Sun-Maid SUN-MAID, http://www.sunmaid.com/about-sun-maid.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Our History, OCEAN SPRAY, http://www.oceanspray.com/VWho-
We-Are/Heritage/Our-History.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); REI Overview, REI, http://
www.rei.com/about-rei/business.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Bill McNabb on the
Markets, the US Debt Cnsis, and Fee Was VANGUARD (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.
vanguardinvestments.de/content/de/en/articles/insights/markets-and-economy/bill-mnabb-on-
the-markets.shtml; Company Overview, STATE FARM, https://www.statefarm.com/about-us/
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The defining feature of a cooperative firm is that it is owned by
its suppliers of inputs, its workers, or its customers. These owners
receive both the cooperative's profits and control the firm. A
quintessential cooperative grocery store, for example, is owned by its
customers. In contrast, most large-scale enterprises are owned by
outside investors having no relationship with the firm other than as
investors. These unique features of cooperatives affect all aspects of
the firm, from how it is run to how and what it produces.
Cooperatives have received renewed attention. The United
Nations proclaimed 2012 the International Year of Cooperatives,2 and
the United States Senate passed an honorary resolution to the same
effect.' The United States Congress devoted $2 billion to subsidize
health insurance cooperatives as part of the Affordable Care Act.4 The
management consulting firm McKinsey and Company published a
comprehensive report dedicated to various aspects of cooperative
development.! The financial crisis and ensuing economic stagnation
have reinvigorated calls for alternatives to investor ownership.' And
after a period in which cooperatives were largely overlooked by
academics, research is once again beginning to turn toward this
organizational form.
company-overview/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Company Overiew, Nw. MUTUAL, http://
www.northwesternmutual.com/about-northwestern-mutual/our-company/company-overview.
aspx#Mutuality (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Frequently Asked Questions, ACE, http://
www.acehardware.com/corp/index.jsp?page-faq (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); About Us,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, http://www.ap.org/company/about-us (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); see
GAR ALPEROVITZ, AMERICA BEYOND CAPITALISM 83 (2005) (explaining that Gore-Tex is a
cooperative firm).
2. International Year of Cooperatives 2012, UNITED NATIONS, http://social.un.org/
coopsyear/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
3. S. Res. 87, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted).
4. Establishment of Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan (CO-OP) Program, 76
Fed. Reg. 77,392 (Dec. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 156); The CO-OP Health
Insurance Pgramn, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Feb. 28, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicy
briefs/brief pdfs/healthpolicybrief 87.pdf
5. McKinsey on Cooperatives, MCKINSEY & CO. (2012), http://www.mckinsey.com/
clientservice/strategy/latestjthinking/-/media/C22BEB228D8448968296276626A181 BB.a
shx.
6. Linda D. Phillips, Worker Cooperatives: Their Tme Has Arnive4 40 COLO. LAW.
33, 33 (2011); Nancy Folbre, The Case for Worker Co-Ops, N.Y TIMES EcoNoMIX (Nov. 23,
2009, 7:45 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/the-case-for-worker-co-ops/.
7. For examples of recent work, see Partha Dasgupta, New Fronties ofCooperation
in the Economy, 1 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL & ORGANIZATIONAL DIVERSITY 7 (2012); Henry
Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution ofShareholder Vothg Rights: Separation
of Owneshi and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 100 (2014); Gowri J. Krishna, Worker
Cooperatve Creation as Progressive Lawyenng? Moving Beyond the One-Peason, One- Vote
Floor, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65 (2013); Ariana R. Levinson, Founding Worker
Cooperatives: Social Movement Theory and the Law, 14 NEv. L.J. (forthcoming 2014); Marc
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Collectively, cooperatives account for $1.6 trillion in revenue,
$500 billion of which is produced within the United States.! While
this presence is not insignificant, it is dwarfed by the more common
investor-owned firm. Value added from cooperative operations is on
the order of only 1% of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP)." This
pattern of ownership is puzzling given both the theoretical and
demonstrated advantages the cooperative form has to offer. "
Conventional explanations focus on theoretical costs of particular
types of cooperatives to explain their observed absence from the
economy at large, arguing that in most cases the costs of cooperative
ownership outweigh its benefits.12 These explanations rely heavily
upon an evolutionary theory of ownership: over the long term,
cooperatives succeed in certain sectors because characteristics of those
sectors enable cooperatives to outcompete alternative ownership types,
and cooperatives do not penetrate other sectors because characteristics
of those sectors lead cooperatives to be inefficient." This theory is
essentially an application of Darwin's "survival of the fittest" to
organizational forms.
The theory gives scant attention to how firms are started, because
it assumes firms either start as, or convert to, cooperatives if
cooperatives maximize owners' ongoing net benefits. If this
assumption is violated, then cooperatives will be underrepresented in
the economy at large, in spite of ongoing efficiencies they offer,
Schneiberg, Toward an Organizationally Diverse American Capitalism? Cooperative,
Mutual, and Local, State-Owned Enterpise, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REv 1409 (2011); Justin
Schwartz, Were Did MIl Go Wrong? Why the Capital-Managed Firm Rather than the
Labor-Managed Enterpnse Is the Predominant Organizational Form in Market Economies,
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 219 (2012).
8. Global300 Report, 2010, INT'L Coop. ALLIANCE 2, http://2012.coop/sites/default/
files/attachments/Global300%20Report%20201 1 .pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
9. Steven Deller et al., Research on the Economic Impact of Cooperatives, UNIv. OF
Wis. CTR. FOR Coops. 2 (June 19, 2009), http://reic.uwcc.wisc.edu/sites/all/REICFINAL.
pdf.
10. Compare id. (finding $133.5 billion of value-added from cooperatives), with
GDP (Current US $), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDPMKTP.CD
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (listing U.S. GDP as $15 trillion). Cooperatives' share of total
wages is also small, estimated at $25 billion out of a countrywide total of $6 trillion, or 0.4%
of all wages. Compare Deller et al., supra note 9, at 2 (finding $25 billion in cooperative
wages), with Establishments, Employment, and Wages, 2001-2010AnnualAvriges BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTIcs, http://www.bls.gov/cew/ewl0tablel.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2014)
(showing $6 trillion in total wages in the United States).
11. These advantages are discussed infra Part Ill.
12. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 24-49 (1996).
13. Id. at 22-23. By efficient, I mean the maximization of not just financial benefits,
but all benefits, emotional or otherwise, gained by persons dealing with the firm, as long as
they are willing to pay for them. See id. at 23.
902 [Vol. 88:899
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because of particular constraints faced by cooperative entrepreneurs.
In that case, survivorship provides only an incomplete picture of
cooperatives' potential success.
This Article finds that this assumption is often violated. Because
of unique attributes of the cooperative form, cooperatives are more
difficult to organize than investor-owned counterparts. 14 The
entrepreneur who organizes as a cooperative instead of as an investor-
owned firm supplies what is in essence a public good, and just as
unsubsidized public goods are undersupplied, so too are cooperative
starts. A cooperative entrepreneur must share much of the firm's
profits with comembers instead of capturing them for herself.
Therefore, unless entrepreneurs derive satisfaction from the well-being
of others or the cooperative offers exceptional advantages over investor
ownership, cooperatives will not start even if they maximize owners'
returns." Compounding the problem, in most situations coordination
difficulties and a lack of established broker institutions keep existing
investor-owned firms from converting to cooperatives, even when the
cooperative form has higher ongoing net benefits.
Thus, while in many instances investor ownership truly is the
superior ownership form, in others the cooperative would be the better
choice, and yet the formative step is never taken. Investor ownership
proliferates even in circumstances where it is comparatively
inefficient. Examples of existing cooperative success identify only
those situations where socially minded entrepreneurs left their mark or
where the net benefits of cooperative ownership so far exceed investor
ownership that cooperatives surmount their start-up barriers.
This finding yields several policy implications. First, since in
some unexploited industries cooperatives could maximize ongoing
benefits from ownership once they started, social welfare could be
14. Throughout this Article, I contrast cooperatives with investor-owned firms. The
key difference between the two is how cooperatives use their ownership structure to overcome
market contracting failures that arise with investor-owned firms. See infra Part II. As will
become clear, these same failures also arise with a variety of closely held firms such as sole
proprietorships, some partnerships, and even some firms that might resemble cooperatives in
certain respects. See bird notes 108-114 and accompanying text. Investor-owned firms are
the most visible embodiment of this situation, so it is the term I use throughout the Article to
refer to this more general situation. The line between the two can become blurred. See birf
notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
15. In economic terms, although the entrepreneur may maximize social welfare by
organizing as a cooperative, she will generally not start the cooperative because much of this
welfare is a positive extemality that benefits others from her perspective; she maximizes her
personal welfare by choosing the investor-owned firm.
16. SeeinfaPartlV
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improved by subsidizing cooperatives. Tax subsidies, grants, or
regulatory interventions, like American Bar Association (ABA) rules
requiring cooperative ownership of law firms by lawyers, are ways to
achieve this goal. Second, arguments for a shareholder primacy theory
of corporate governance, in which management is answerable
exclusively to the economic interests of shareholders, may be weaker
than previously thought. These arguments attribute cooperatives' rarity
to theoretical costs from management's being answerable to diverse
cooperative owners, but if cooperatives' low market share is instead
driven by formation difficulty, these management agency costs may be
overstated, as are the potential gains from having management
responsible exclusively to homogenous investor-owners.
Obtaining the appropriate mix of firm ownership is a crucial
issue of public importance. Most broadly, when investor ownership is
inefficiently chosen as the organizational form merely because it is
easy to start, society's capital is tied up in organizations that produce at
higher cost than necessary, translating into higher prices and inferior
products. But the importance of ownership structure transcends
minimizing the costs of products and services. Ownership structure
affects every interaction with a firm. It can determine whether and
how public goods are provided, whether costly government regulation
is necessary, whether workers are happy, or whether customers are
exploited. For example, if more banks were organized as credit union
consumer cooperatives instead of as investor-owned firms, perhaps the
financial crisis would have been muted, given credit unions' lesser
engagement in subprime lending-a result predicted by their
organizational form." And finally, firm ownership can become a topic
of heated political discussion-these issues were at the heart of
capitalist-versus-communist debates of the 1950s and 1960s.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II introduces the concept
of firm ownership and identifies why it matters. Here I use an
17. See "Credit Crunch: Is the CFPB Restricting Access to Credit?" Hearng
Before the Subcomm on TARP, Fin. Servs. & Bailouts ofPub & Pnvate Programs of the H
Comm. on Ovesight & Govt Reform, 112th Cong. 3 (2012) (testimony of Douglas A.
Fecher, President and CEO of Wright-Patt Credit Union on behalf of the Credit Union
National Association), avaulable at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/
Fecher-Testimonypdf ("[C]redit unions did not cause the financial crisis; they did not seek or
receive any taxpayer bailout; and they did not engage in the type of activity that prompted the
creation of the [Consumer Finance Protection] Bureau."); Andrew Martin & Ron Lieber,
Alternative to Banks, NowPlaying Offense, N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 2010, at BI ("[M]ost credit
unions did not engage in the type of risky lending that led to the [financial] crisis."). See
generally Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual Ownership, 105 J.
PuB. EcoN. 39 (2013) (showing how credit unions are less likely to exploit consumer biases).
904 [Vol. 88:899
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example of possible owners of an insurance company to show the
practical effects of ownership, while at the same time introducing the
evolutionary theory that is important in traditional explanations of
cooperative activity.
Part Ell turns to cooperatives, firms whose owners are also either
suppliers, workers, or customers of the firm. This Part provides an
overview of where cooperatives have gained traction and develops how
cooperatives are different from investor-owned firms. The intuition
developed here will be used to identify inconsistencies with
conventional accounts of firm ownership.
Part IV tackles the core question: if cooperatives are efficient,
why are they not more common? This Part examines entrepreneur and
broker behavior and finds that in most circumstances, cooperatives
will not appear even when they maximize owners' ongoing benefits.
This finding explains several empirical observations that the
conventional wisdom cannot.
Part V addresses the policy issue: what should be done in those
circumstances where cooperatives are efficient but face barriers to
formation? This Part considers how cooperatives could be subsidized
through tax policy, direct government financial subsidy, or regulatory
policy. It closes by showing how this approach could be applied in
practice, using the new Affordable Care Act subsidy of health
insurance cooperatives as an example.
II. PRINCIPLES OF OWNERSHIP AND THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
Most firms are owned by investors." Many people take this fact
as a given, yet it need not be the case. Does it matter who owns the
firm? Does it make sense that most firms are owned by investors?
This Part answers these questions: the first with an emphatic "yes"
and the second with a "maybe."
Three broad groups could be owners, or those with formal
control rights and the right to receive the firm's profits." First, there
18. HANSMANN, supm note 12, at 12.
19. Id. at 21. In theory, the right to control and the right to receive residual profits
could be separated and assigned to different classes, but in practice such separation rarely
occurs because of the incentive incompatibility resulting from having those in control not
answerable to those with residual claims. Id. at 12. Venture capital and private equity firms
are conspicuous examples where the right to control is separated from the right to residual
assets. Investors in these firms have no effective control rights. See generally Ronald J.
Gilson, Engineerng a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the Ameican Expeience, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1067, 1071-72 (2003) (describing the organization of venture capital firms).
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could be no owners-the firm could be a nonprofit, in which no class
has the right to receive residual profits.20 Second, owners could be
suppliers of equity-in other words, the firm could be investor-
owned.2' These firms' defining feature is that the formal rights to
control and residual profits are tied only to how much capital a closed
group of investors provides.22 Finally, owners could be a class having a
relationship with the firm beyond mere provision of equity. The firm
could be owned by its suppliers of inputs, by its workers, or by its
customers. In this case, the firm is a cooperative.23
A fundamental issue to be addressed when starting a firm is the
organizational form to adopt. Most literature on entity choice analyzes
which form within a particular ownership structure is efficient. For
example, within investor ownership, are limited liability companies,
partnerships, or publicly held corporations best?24 This Article instead
focuses on which ownemsbp structure as between investor ownership
and cooperative is better.
I sketch here an example of how ownership structure matters,
leaving a systematic development to Part 111. Ownership choice can be
considered as one of the inputs factoring into the firm's production
process.25 If ownership of a life insurance company is assigned to
external investors,2 as occurs with the standard business corporation,2
Generally, the right to residual assets and the formal right of control are bundled together, and
this Article considers primarily this case.
20. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838
(1980).
21. Investor-owned firms may not always be "purely" investor-owned, as when the
management of a publicly traded corporation may get bonuses if the company does better, in
effect giving some workers a claim to residual assets. Or one member of a two-person
partnership may initially contribute "sweat equity" instead of financial capital. In all these
circumstances, however, there is the potential for contracting market failures that I discuss
h2fia Part III. See also sources cited supm note 14.
22. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 13.
23. Because this Article focuses on private ownership of firms, it will not deal with
governmental ownership of firms, such as a municipally owned water supply or state-owned
educational facilities.
24. See, e g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION (2010)
(discussing the ownership and governance of partnerships and limited liability companies).
25. See HANsMANN, supra note 12, at 12-16. See generallyRIBSTEIN, supra note 24
(analyzing how the choice between standard corporate forms or limited liability corporations
and partnerships influences the interactions among owners and managers).
26. Throughout this Article, investor ownership will refer to firms owned by
contributors of equity who have no other relationship with the firm unless specified
otherwise, which comports with a common understanding of the term. As will become clear
later, cooperatives also have investor-owners in a sense, but these investors have another
relationship as supplier, worker, or customer.
27. HANSMANN, supa note 12, at 12-13.
906
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financing may be cheap and plentiful, providing both for savings that
can be translated into lower prices as well as for easy business
expansion.28 The insurer's management, however, has the incentive to
exploit policyholders' lock-in to long-term contracts2 and sell inferior
insurance to produce profits for investors." If, on the other hand,
ownership is assigned to policyholders, the direct incentive to
expropriate from policyholders is removed. The policyholder-owned
insurer may therefore provide a better product for which policyholders
will gladly pay. However, because the policyholder-owned firm lacks
access to broad equity markets, costs of capital are greater." Finally, if
ownership is assigned to the insurer's workers, wages (and costs) may
rise, yet be offset by increased productivity stemming from
ownership's motivating force on workers." However, costs of capital
are, again, greater." Choice of ownership involves selecting one of
these comparative advantages to the exclusion of the others.'
The example shows how assigning ownership to a class of
participants enables the firm to convert a relationship for which it
would ordinarily have to contract on the market into a feature of
ownership, saving those market-contracting "transaction" costs. The
investor-owned firm, for example, foregoes some of its market
contracting for financing-and by extension does not incur the
transacting costs of debt-by making investors the owners in exchange
for their capital contributions." But ownership creates its own costs,"
which I return to in Part UI.C.
28. See infia notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
29. Life insurance policies are routinely written for ten, twenty, or thirty years. Since
these policies are written so that premiums during early years subsidize premiums in later
years, a policyholder who switches companies before the end of a contract term forfeits the
accumulated subsidy. See Henry Hansmann, The Orgamzation of Insurance Companies:
Mutual versus Stock, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 125, 132-33 (1985).
30. Indeed, this situation was a motivating factor behind forming cooperatively
owned life insurance companies (known as "mutuals" in the insurance area) and in the
conversion of several investor-owned life insurers to mutuals in the 1950s. Linda Pickthorne
Fletcher, Motivations Underlyig the Mutualizadon ofStock Life Insurance Companies, 33 J.
RISK & INS. 19, 21-22 (1966) (describing the conversion of investor-owned life insurers to
mutually-owned companies as an effort to achieve, among other benefits, "curtailment of the
insurance company stockholders' profit-making opportunities ... and other abuses");
Hansmann, supra note 29, at 132-33 (describing this problem as a reason for life insurance
mutuals' early success).
31. See infa notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
32. SeeinimPart III.
33. HANsMANN, supra note 12, at 21-22, 107.
34. Id. at 21-22.
35. Id. at 53-58.
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Market incentives push firms to maximize the net benefits
resulting from choice of ownership, leading them to choose an
"efficient" form of ownership-the form that maximizes the
difference between benefits and costs of ownership." Firms that adopt
some other form will be outcompeted by competitors that have
adopted the benefit-maximizing form-the Darwinian "evolutionary"
approach to ownership." Remember that these benefits and costs are
not confined to financial benefits, but include all benefits and costs,
emotional or otherwise, to persons dealing with the firm.39
Assigning a rough number to our insurance example helps make
the point. Suppose the insurer offers 1000 identical insurance policies
and, taking investor ownership as the baseline, its cost of doing so is
$1,000,000. The insurer therefore charges $1000 per policy. If
customers own the insurer as a cooperative insurance company, its cost
of doing business increases by $100,000 to reflect higher costs of
capital.40 The insurer therefore charges $1100 for this policy. Finally,
if workers own the insurer, its cost of doing business (relative to
investor ownership) increases by $100,000 to reflect a higher cost of
capital and by a further $50,000 to pay for improved working
conditions but decreases by $60,000 because the workers work more
36. Id at 33-49. Thesecosts are particularly great when there is more than one class
of owners-so great that their costs regularly exceed the savings of avoided market
contracting costs, which is why firms usually have at most one class of owners. Id at 44
(dividing ownership among several classes "threatens to increase the costs of collective
decision making enormously"); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
EcoNoMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 37-38 (1991) ("[A] manager told to serve two
masters ... has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.").
37. Hansmann, supm note 20, at 838; see also Eugene F Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Sepaation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 301, 301 (1983) (analyzing firms'
incentive to maximize benefits of ownership); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi,
Choice of Form and Network Externalities 43 WM. & MARY L. REv 79, 81-82, 128 (2001)
(finding closely held firms choose ownership forms to maximize benefits of ownership).
38. Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty Evolution and Economic Theory 58 J. POL.
EcoN. 211, 216 (1950); Eugene F Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and
Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 333 (1983). The evolutionary theory provides a
powerful explanation for legal institutions beyond ownership form. See, eg., Robert C.
Ellickson, Property in Lang 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1357-62 (1993) (applying this theory to the
challenge of identify ing efficient land-use institutions).
39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
40. Both "cooperative" and "mutual" are terms that generally refer to an organization
owned by its customers. See RICHARD B. HEFLEBOWER, COOPERATIVES AND MUTUALS IN THE
MARKET SYSTEM 3, 213 n.1 (1980). For historical reasons, cooperative insurance companies
outside health insurance are referred to as mutuals. Id. at 162-76; PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 295-306 (1982) (discussing cooperative health
insurers).
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efficiently. As a result, the insurer's total costs are $1,090,000, and the
insurer therefore charges $1090 per policy.
In this example, if the policy is identical across insurers, then
policyholders will patronize the investor-owned company because it
offers policies at the cheapest price. Over the long-term, the investor-
owned company will outcompete its policyholder- and worker-owned
counterparts until only the investor-owned insurer remains.
Applying the evolutionary theory suggests that over long time
horizons, the ownership form that outcompetes alternatives is the form
that has maximized the net benefits of ownership associated with
producing that firm's particular product.4 1 For some products, more
than one ownership form may persevere if there is demand for
different attributes associated with those products. For example, some
policyholders will prefer high-quality, policyholder-friendly insurance,
while other policyholders are willing to sacrifice quality for a lower
price. 42 In that case, one ownership form (policyholder-owned
cooperatives) will provide the high-quality product at the cheapest
price, while another ownership form (investor-owned) will provide the
low-quality product at the cheapest price, and both ownership forms
might coexist." Within each type of product, however, one would
expect a dominant form of ownership to emerge over the long term.
Policyholder-owned insurers would exclusively provide higher-quality,
higher-cost insurance, and only investor-owned insurers would offer
lower-quality, lower-cost policies.
As this example shows, firms need not be investor-owned. Yet
over time, in most industries, the successful large firms are investor-
owned." Nevertheless, cooperatives have existed for hundreds of
years, often even within the same industry as investor-owned firms.45
The following Part addresses why, exploring the impact of
41. HANsMANN, supm note 12, at 22-23; Alchian, supm note 38, at 216.
42. Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluatng Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. Cm. L.
REv. 1263, 1319-20 (2011).
43. HANSMANN, supm note 12, at 133-38.
44. Id at 1, 267; see also RIBSTEIN, supm note 24, at 2-3 (discussing the prevalence
of "uncorporate" large-scale enterprise, including limited liability corporations and
partnerships, in which suppliers of capital-investors-are generally the owners).
45. For example, Benjamin Franklin started a cooperatively owned insurance
company in 1752, which continues today. HAROLD W WATERS, A CENTURY OF COMMITMENT:
A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANIES, 1895-1995, at
5 (1994); Company History, PHILA. CONTRIBuTIONsIP, http://www.contributionship.com/
history/index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). Eighteenth-century Caribbean pirate crews
are another example of early successful worker cooperatives. See genedlyPETERT. LEESON,
THE INVISIBLE HOOK: THE HIDDEN EcoNoMICS OF PIRATES 23-44 (2009) (discussing the
organization of these pirate crews).
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cooperatives and considering their advantages and disadvantages
relative to their investor-owned counterparts.
III. COOPERATIVES
The scope and scale of cooperative enterprise are widespread and
diverse both domestically and abroad. What is different about
cooperative ownership versus investor ownership? How do these
differences translate into different costs and benefits from ownership?
This Part explores these questions. While not a complete survey of
cooperative enterprise, it provides a good indication of cooperatives'
relative strengths and weaknesses.
A. Cooperative Fundamentals
Although a precise definition of a cooperative is lacking,
cooperatives in their most general sense are firms owned and
controlled by a class of those who interact with the firm in a
noninvestor relationship, such as by supplying inputs, working for it, or
buying its products." This minimalistic definition is often expanded
by the "seven cooperative principles" around which cooperatives
generally operate:
1. Voluntary and Open Membership
2. Democratic Control by Members
3. Capital Contributed Equitably by Members
4. The Cooperative Is an Autonomous, Independent
Organization Controlled by the Members
5. Education and Training Provided to Members
6. Cooperation Among Cooperatives
7. Concern for Community"
46. See CHARLES T AuITRY & ROLAND F. HALL, THE LAW OF COOPERATIVES 2 (2009);
HANSMANN, supm note 12, at 21; see also Frost v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 278 U.S. 515, 546
(1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[N]o one plan of organization is to be labeled as truly co-
operative to the exclusion of others .... "). While states have cooperative-specific
incorporation laws, cooperatives can be (and are) organized under a variety of incorporation
laws, including C-corporation, limited liability corporation, and nonprofit corporation
statutes. Deller et al., supra note 9, at 7. For representative examples of cooperative-specific
laws, see 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 310/1-27 (2013); N.Y. COOP. CORP. LAW §§ 1-134 (2013).
47. Co-Operative Identity Values & Pnnciples, INT'L CooP. ALLIANCE, http://ica.
coop/en/whats-co-op/co-operative-identity-values-principles (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
These are the current manifestation of the seven cooperative operating principles, which have
evolved over time. For a history, see Ann Hoyt, And Then There Were Seven: Cooperative
Pnnciples Update4 UNIv. OF WIs. CTR. FOR COOPS., http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/staff/hoyt/
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Firms need not adopt all principles to obtain advantages of
cooperatives. The key feature is ownership-the right to control and
receive residual assets-by suppliers, workers, or customers, who can
be termed the "patrons" of the firm.48 I return to this point at the end
of this Part in assessing what attributes are essential for cooperatives'
advantages, after critically examining areas of cooperative success.
Like an investor-owned firm, cooperative owners supply equity.49
But unlike typical investor-owned firms, cooperative-equity investors
wear two hats: their investor hat and their patron hat. To limit
problems that could arise between conflicting investor and patron
interests, cooperatives effectively remove the investor interest from the
picture by eliminating returns on equity and requiring equal equity
contributions from members." Once the returns on equity have been
removed, cooperative owners share a common interest in maximizing
their returns from the patron relationship, just as external investors in
the investor-owned firm share a common desire to maximize the firm's
residual earnings. These restraints on equity, however, can create costs
for cooperatives that are examined in Part II.C below.
Having outlined the basic nuts and bolts of how cooperatives are
structured, I now transition to a discussion of how this makes
cooperatives different from investor-owned firms. The following
Subpart discusses the theory of when cooperatives will excel and
princart.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (originally published in COOPERATIVE GROCER, Jan.-
Feb. 1996).
The USDA defines a cooperative similarly as "a business owned and democratically
controlled by the people who use its services and whose benefits are derived and distributed
equitably on the basis of use." Donald A. Frederick, Cooperative Information Report 55, Co-
ops 101: An Introduction to Cooperatives, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RURAL Div., http://www.rur
dev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/cir55/cir55rpt.htm (last updated June 1997). In determining whether an
organization qualifies for tax treatment, the IRS has adopted a similar set of principles. See
Puget Sound Plywood, Inc. v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 305, 308 (1965), acq. 1966-2 C.B. 3 (requir-
ing subordination of capital interests, democratic control by patron-owners (right of control),
and accrual of profits to patron-owners (right to residual assets)). On occasion, the IRS
considers additional factors, such as if the cooperative has a minimum number of members.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-19-030 (May 8, 1992).
48. This nomenclature follows that first proposed by Henry Hansmann. Henry
Hansmann, Ownershio ofthe Farm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 267, 270 (1988).
49. See HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 152-53.
50. See Jeffrey S. Royer, Cooperative Priiciples and Equity Financing: A Critical
Discussion, 7 J. AGRiC. COOPERATION 79, 82-83 (1992) (equity contributions); Bob Cropp et
al., Equity Redemption Practices: A Study of Wisconsi Cooperatives, UNIV. OF Wis. CTR.
FOR COOPS. (Sept. 1998), http://www.uwcc.wisc.edulinfo/equity_2.html (cooperative equity
practices); Frederick, supra note 47 (same); Great Rivers Coop. of Se. Iowa v. Farmland
Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d 685, 700 (8th Cir. 1999) ("[P]atrons of a cooperative ordinarily base
their decisions to join a cooperative on the effectiveness of the services provided rather than
on the risk inherent in an investment.").
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surveys where and how cooperatives operate. This discussion shows
when cooperatives are superior to investor-owned firms, setting the
stage for the primary puzzle: when are cooperatives better, and why
are they still uncommon?
B. Coopemtive Benefits
At a basic level, all cooperatives accomplish vertical integration,
coupling the firm with an upstream (supplier/producer) or downstream
(consumer) process." Because of this vertical integration, the
cooperative captures the profits ordinarily accruing to the upstream or
downstream process." If this transfer of profits from one group to
another were all cooperatives accomplished, there would be no
compelling policy reason to support them since they would be merely
welfare-transferring, not welfare-creating. However, in certain circum-
stances, the unique attributes of cooperative ownership actually create
benefits, justifying a preference for cooperatives under these
conditions.
An investor-owned firm must contract on the market with patrons
for all patron-firm interactions beyond the provision of equity." In
circumstances discussed below, this contracting relationship generates
particularly high transaction costs. Because ownership by a group of
patrons avoids having to contract with those patrons on the market by
making them owners, cooperative ownership by patrons provides the
benefit of avoiding these costs.54
Several types of imperfections can come up in market contracting
with an investor-owned firm, but there are four that are particularly
relevant." First, the firm could have market power over a group of
patrons. Second, asymmetric information can exist between the firm
and its patrons, where one party can use its private information to
exploit the other. In these first two circumstances, ownership of the
51. See, e.g., KENNETH D. RUBLE, MEN TO REMEMBER: How 100,000 NEIGHBORS
MADE HISTORY 25 (1947) (discussing this benefit in the case of the Land O'Lakes producer
cooperative).
52. Seeid.
53. HANSMANN, supn note 12, at 53.
54. As a direct consequence of the First and Second Fundamental Welfare Theorems
of economics, absent such market imperfections, ownership choice would be of no social
consequence. It is precisely because of the imperfections that ownership matters. ANDREU
MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 308-09 (1995).
55. While these are three instances where market failures commonly arise, they are
not an exhaustive list. Behavioral psychology has developed several other ways in which
markets can fail, due to various biases and cognitive limitations of its participants. Where
appropriate, I discuss these additional limitations.
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firm by patrons acts as a commitment mechanism where the firm
pledges not to exploit its patron-owners, since any gains from
exploitation ultimately flow to the owners. Third, actions by the firm
or its patrons could generate positive or negative externalities."
Fourth, the mere act of ownership by patrons can induce desirable
activity by those patrons that is not replicable through market
contracting or through ownership by investors, as in worker ownership.
These imperfections generate a broad array of situations where
cooperative ownership has benefits over investor ownership. The
following Subparts survey examples where cooperatives have
demonstrated success. In doing so, the Subparts develop situations of
market power, asymmetric information, provision of goods with
positive externalities, and ownership motivation that cooperatives
address. The Subparts structure these examples according to whether
the cooperative's owners are producers who generate a product
supplied to the cooperative, workers, or consumers of the cooperative's
output. Examining cooperatives by owner type clearly exposes areas
of unexploited cooperative advantage that motivate the discussion of
Part IV
1. Producer Cooperatives
I begin with producer cooperatives, where the owners of the
cooperative are those producing an input in the cooperative's activities.
Many producer cooperatives are agricultural cooperatives," where
farmers supply inputs to the cooperative. The cooperative then sells
these inputs, sometimes after processing them into a more refined
form. Familiar examples of producer cooperatives include fixtures of
agriculture such as the Sun-Maid Raisin cooperative, which sells
raisins supplied by its owners," and Land O'Lakes, which turns milk
from its owners into butter and cheese before selling it."
In almost all cases, producer cooperatives form in response to
actual or potential market power.' When producers face a buyer of
their product who can dictate terms of trade (such as when buyers are
56. There is significant overlap between positive externality goods and public goods.
I refer throughout this Article to the more general positive externality goods classification
and take it to represent the case where the good provider or consumer cannot capture others'
benefit from production or consumption of the good.
57. See Types of Coopemtives, 2012 INT'L YEAR OF CooPERATrIvEs, http://usa2Ol2.
coop/about-co-ops/types (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
58. See About Sun-Maig supra note 1.
59. See Our Story, suprd note 1.
60. See Types of Cooperatives, supra note 57.
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large and few but producer sellers are small and numerous), producers
have much to gain by collectively taking over the buying activities,
replacing the buyer with a cooperative owned by themselves that does
not exercise its market power." As is the case whenever a restricted
market is opened up to competition, these cooperatives increase social
welfare.62
In markets with a monopsony buyer, unless government
regulation constrains the activities of the buyer, the economies of scale
inherent in these activities push toward an equilibrium where a single
market buyer ultimately emerges." As long as this single buyer is
investor-owned, it naturally seeks to wield its market power over
suppliers to pursue maximum financial returns for its investor-owners,
a pattern that has occurred repeatedly.' Government regulation can
work in two ways: constraining firm size or constraining firm activity.
Either solution imposes costs on society. Constraining firm size
means economies of scale cannot be fully realized and the firm's costs
are comparatively high, while constraining firm activity requires costly
regulatory vigilance. An ideal solution is a single firm that commits
not to exercise its market power as it realizes economies of scale.
Producer cooperatives accomplish this goal. Because they are owned
by suppliers-the parties over whom they could exercise market
61. Even if the resultant cooperative flexed its market-power muscle, monopsony
profits (profits accruing to a buyer with market power who forces down input prices)
previously captured by the monopsony purchaser instead go to the producers, solving the
market-power problem.
62. See, e.g., MAS-COLELL ET AL., supm note 54, at 387-95. Cooperatives not only
transfer the monopsonist's profits to the suppliers, but also expand purchases of supplies
beyond the monopsonist's restricted level, which is an incremental social benefit that
cooperative ownership provides.
63. See Yoav Kislev & Willis Peterson, Economies of Scale i Agicultu: A
Reexanination ofthe Evidence, in 2 THE EcoNOMICS OF AGRICULTURE: PAPERS IN HONOR OF
D. GALE JOHNSON 156 (John M. Antle & Daniel A Sumner eds., 1996); HANSMANN, supra
note 12, at 123-24, 141-42 (grain farmers); Types of Cooperatives, supra note 57 (market
power of dairy buyers); RUBLE, supra note 51, at 29 (market power of butter buyers); Ted C.
Schroeder, Economies of Scale and Scope for Aguicultual Supply and Marketing
Cooperatives, 14 REv. AGRIC. EcoN. 93 (1992) (economies of scale for several agricultural
buyers); JOHN A.C. HETHERINGTON, MUTUAL AND COOPERATIVE ENTERPRISES: AN ANALYSIS
OF CUSTOMER-OWNED FIRMS IN THE UNITED STATES 129 (1991) (grain farmers). The majority
of farming is still done at a small scale, with 96% of farms operated by families, farmer
partnerships, or cooperatives. Andrew Zenk, Management Tip. Thoughtful Succession
Planning Keeps Families Farming for Generations; RURAL COOPERATIVES, Sept./Oct. 2012, at
18.
64. For example, successful new investor-owned entrants to butter marketing
repeatedly grew to a large size that enabled them to outcompete local providers, and once the
local competitors closed, the remaining investor-owned firms engaged in monopsony pricing.
RUBLE, supra note 51, at 105-08.
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power-these organizations can grow to capitalize fully on economies
of scale while reducing the threat of harmfully wielding market power
because doing so does not benefit its owners. As a consequence,
society can have large-scale buyers that fully capture economies of
scale without having to pay the expense of monitoring them to make
sure they do not harmfully wield their market power."
Although producer cooperatives arise primarily in response to
market power, once established they may provide secondary benefits,
such as research and development into improving the quality of
owners' supplied inputs. Industries like farming benefit from
continual reinvention and refining of technique, but if these
improvements have positive externalities, they will be underprovided
by the private market." For instance, the profit maximizer lacks full
incentive to develop improvements for milk production if others easily
learn of and replicate her technique." Nor do investor-owned buyers
of producers' inputs have sufficient reason to develop and disseminate
this information if it could spread to other producers.
65. If the cooperative grows large, however, it could instead serve as a coordination
mechanism among suppliers to assemble and exercise their own market power. For example,
dairy farmers might form a milk-processing cooperative and then attempt to use its resultant
power over retail milk sales to drive up the retail market price of milk. Empirical evidence
suggests this concern is far more academic than real. Even though certain agricultural
cooperatives are given special antitrust treatment by the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 291-292 (2012), they generally are unable to assemble market power of their own.
HANSMANN, supm note 12, at 126-29 (finding the only arguable exception to this principle to
be fresh milk cooperatives, which operate in a regulatory regime particularly conducive to
anticompetitive behavior); James G. Youde & Peter G. Helmberger, Marketing Coopemtives
in the US: Membership Policies, Market Power and Antitrust Policy, 48 J. FARM EcoN. 23,
33 (1966). In many respects this may be because most cooperatives are "open" to any new
member that wishes to join, as in the Seven Cooperative Principles, so that monopoly profits
quickly attract new producers to the cooperative, making it increasingly difficult to sustain
above-market prices. Id But even those few producer cooperatives with "closed" member-
ship that restricts new members from joining have been unsuccessful at assembling market
power. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 126-29. In large part this is because a closed
cooperative that succeeds in raising prices through market power raises prices for farmers
both in and out of the cooperative, encouraging out-of-cooperative farmers to expand
operations and undermine the cooperative's market power. Id. To the extent the closed
cooperative can differentiate its product from out-of-cooperative farmers', however, its
attempt at market power could prove successful. So-called "new generation" cooperatives,
which have gained limited popularity in certain agriculture processing markets, are a
potential for this type of market power. See David Coltrain et al., Differences Between New
Generation Coopeatives and Taditional Cooperatives, UNIV. OF WIS.-MADISON, CTR. FOR
Coops. (Aug. 2000), http://www.uwcc.wisc.edu/info/newgen/cbb.pdf.
66. MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 54, at 361-62.
67. Although she would benefit from her own efficiency gains, she gains nothing
from the others' improvements. See Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming
Impedinents to Information Sharing, 55 ALA. L. REv. 231, 264-65 (2004) (discussing the
general problem of information sharing when it benefits others).
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If producers collectively own research and development
operations as a cooperative, however, the cooperative has more reason
to develop improvements, even if knowledge of the technique can
spread easily. The producers benefit-and the cooperative has reason
to fund research-when the cooperative develops production
improvements that are taught to producers for free. The better
producers are at producing, the more the cooperative earns and the
better off are all producer-owners who share in the cooperative's
profits." Because of this, producer cooperatives" have been a fertile
development ground of these positive externality improvements.o
Often, those outside the cooperative ultimately adopt these
improvements as well, making all better off."
There are thus two clear areas where producer cooperatives
succeed: where the buyer of supplied inputs has market power72 and
where goods with positive externalities, like research, benefit
producers." They generally form only to solve market power, however,
rather than in response to any other market failures (information
asymmetries, positive externalities, or motivation from ownership),74
suggesting an opportunity for expansion that I return to in Part IVC. 1.
68. In fact, this product development has reason to go both ways. Members benefit
by informing other members of their own improvements. Ordinarily business rivals have no
inducement to share information for which they cannot charge a fee; in fact, if sharing
information makes rivals more productive and lowers the market price, there is a disincentive
to sharing information. See generally id. (discussing this problem). When rivals own a
cooperative, however, a rival's increased productivity translates into profits for all owners,
providing inducement for information sharing even among rivals. See id at 267 (noting the
potential for increased information sharing "in industries with a history of cooperation ...
among rivals").
69. This arm of the producer cooperative's activity could also be conceptualized as
being that of a consumer cooperative, where the farmers are consumers of research and
development. See mfra Part III.
70. See, e.g., RUBLE, supra note 51, at 25, 99, 175-76, 179-80 (discussing Land
O'Lakes's role in developing improved farming practices, new ways to use farmer-supplied
inputs, and new methods for transporting fragile produce). While agricultural cooperatives
have more incentive than investor-owned firms to undertake this research, they will still
provide a suboptimal amount (from the perspective of society at large) if the benefits spill
over to others that are not owners of the cooperative.
71. See supa note 43 and accompanying text.
72. The similar presence of cooperatives in economies around the world as a check
on buyer market power suggests the form's particular superiority at minimizing ownership
costs in this situation. See, e.g., George WJ. Hendrikse, Screening, Competition and the
Choice of the Cooperative as an Organisational Form, 49 J. AGRIC. EcoN. 202, 203 (1998)
(describing supplier cooperatives in agricultural markets of other countries).
73. See Frederick, supra note 47.
74. Id.
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Next, I turn to worker cooperatives to develop some additional ways
that cooperatives excel.
2. Worker Cooperatives
Worker cooperatives constitute a relatively small percentage of
total U.S. cooperative activity." The largest global example of a
worker cooperative is the Mondragon cooperative of Spain, an
associated group of cooperative and other organizations in disparate
areas of finance, industry, retail, and technological innovation."
Mondragon has proven remarkably successful, employing 83,000
workers to achieve annual revenues of £15 billion," with productivity
levels exceeding those of its noncooperative counterparts " and
extremely low failure rates of affiliated cooperatives." Worker
cooperatives are widely present (on smaller scales than Mondragon)
throughout other European countries,o and they also operate within the
United States in the form of law firms, medical partnerships, and other
professional corporations where regulation effectively requires the
cooperative form." Other examples of worker cooperatives within the
United States are rare. 2
75. Deller et al., supra note 9, at 11.
76. Tim Huet, News fm Mondragon, GRASSROOTS EcoN. ORG., http://www.
geo.coop/archives/huet.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (noting Mondragon's partnerships
with investor-owned firms); 2011 Annual Repori MONDRAGON 10, 70-97 (Dec. 31, 2011),
http://www.mondragon-corporation.comn/p-content/themes/builder/informe-anual-2012/pdfen/
annual-report-201 1.pdf (listing both subsidiaries and affiliated cooperatives).
77. 2011AnnualRepor supra note 76, at 8.
78. HENK THOMAS & CHRIS LOGAN, MONDRAGON: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 96-130
(1982).
79. GREGORY K. Dow, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS' CONTROL IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 61 (2003). For affiliated cooperatives that are closed, the workers must be
reemployed within a thirty-mile radius. All in Tis Together: How Is the Co-Operative
Model Cophg with the Recession?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.economist.
com/node/13381546.
80. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 103-05; John P. Bonin et al., Theoretical and
Empical Studies of Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Tnn Meet? 31 J. ECON.
LrrERATURE 1290 (1993).
81. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 91. But see Schwartz, supra note 7, at 236-37 n.66
(contesting the classification of professional corporations as worker cooperatives, primarily
because professional corporations usually include some nonmember workers). Nonmember
workers are not exceptional occurrences in worker cooperatives; indeed, Mondragon, which
Schwartz identifies as "[h]ands down, the most successful, long-lasting experience" with
labor management, regularly employs nonmember workers and controls noncooperative
subsidiaries. See id at 239.
82. Nevertheless, they encompass firms both large and small operating in a variety of
industries. Georgeanne M. Artz & Younjun Kim, Business Ownership by Workers: Are
Worker Cooperatives a Viable Option? 9 (Iowa State Univ. Dep't of Econ., Working Paper
No. 11020, Nov. 2011), http://www.econ.iastate.edu/sites/default/files/publications/papers/p
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Theorists have long questioned why worker cooperatives do not
have more of a presence in the modem economy, because they could
solve several market imperfections in the labor market." Professor
Henry Hansmann aptly summarized the potential advantages of
worker ownership as offering "improved employee productivity,
avoidance of opportunism associated with employee lock-in, less
strategic behavior in bargaining [between management and
employees], better communication of employee preferences, and
reduction in worker alienation." Some of these advantages mirror the
discussion of producer cooperatives: because workers can develop
firm-specific knowledge that makes switching employers costly, they
can eliminate problems faced with monopsonist labor demand if they
collectively own the firm.
But worker ownership also solves other market-contracting
problems. Both employers and employees have private information
they may use to exploit the other. Strikes can be a highly visible
manifestation of this asymmetric information problem that results
when neither employers nor employees share complete information
with the other.
Further, worker ownership offers the potential advantage of
workers who work harder and more efficiently as a result of this
ownership. It is not just ownership's residual profit interest that
motivates worker-owners." The actual right to control the firm and the
status of being an owner appear to be powerful motivators of their
own, from which workers derive nonfinancial benefits, driving them to
greater performance than market compensation structures can
achieve." It would be difficult" to make a compelling argument that
14575-2011-11-09.pdf (tabulating worker cooperatives affiliated with the United States
Federation of Worker Cooperatives).
83. Schwartz, supra note 7, at 221 (recounting John Stuart Mill's prediction that
worker-owned firms would outcompete investor-owned counterparts).
84. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 74-75.
85. The rational worker concerned only with profit maximization would realize that
even when she is an owner, her share of incremental firm revenue from working hard will
generally exceed the costs of doing so, and she will slack on effort.
86. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 69-70; Bonin et al., supra note 80, at 1297
(summarizing this evidence); Carla Dickstein, The Promise and Problems of Worker
Cooperadves, 6 J. PLAN. LrrERATURE 16, 19-21 (1991) (same). Worker-owners report feeling
more responsible for firm-wide profits and working harder than workers of investor-owned
firms, showing nonfinancial motivations driving worker-owner behavior. See, e g., Edward
S. Greenberg, Producer Cooperadves and Democratic Theory: The Case of the Plywood
Firms in WORKER COOPERATIVES IN AMERICA 171, 184-86 (Robert Jackall & Henry M.
Levin eds., 1984). Workers who perceive themselves as owners, rather than merely residual
claimants, also have improved morale, motivation, and productivity. See Artz & Kim, suprd
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investor-owners usually have similar nonfinancial benefits from
ownership.88
With the variety of market failures that worker cooperatives can
overcome, it is surprising they are so rare. In addition to their methods
of solving market power, managing information asymmetries, and
providing the motivation of ownership in the ways just discussed,
worker cooperatives could (but generally do not) also provide positive
externality goods such as educating workers for their personal benefit.
I return to this puzzle in Part IV Next, I address the final cooperative
type: consumer cooperatives.
3. Consumer Cooperatives
Consumer cooperatives constitute the bulk of U.S. cooperatives
and operate in diverse areas of the economy." Like producer
cooperatives, they solve problems of market power arising with
interbank payment clearing,' utilities, independent grocers, social
note 82, at 15; Andrew Pendleton & Andrew Robinson, Employee Stock Ownership,
Involvement, and Productivity: An Interaction-Based Approach, 64 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV.
3, 7 (2010); see also RANDY HODSON, DIGNITY AT WoRK 172-89 (2003) (finding workers who
believe their exercise of voice will more likely influence operations to often exercise that
voice more); Elizabeth A. Hoffmann, Exit and Voice: Organizational Loyalty and Dispute
Resolution Strategies, 84 Soc. FORCES 2313 (2006) (finding workers of worker-owned
cooperatives more inclined to exercise the costly "voice" option to improve an organization's
operations, instead of merely exiting the firm).
87. In some cases, investors may take special pride in ownership of a company, such
as investor-owners of a social enterprise providing green energy. Whether their nonfinancial
ownership benefits exceed those of workers owning the firm is an open question. And in
many other circumstances, investors appear far more concerned with financial returns than
with any nonfinancial utility they may derive from ownership.
88. Like producer cooperatives, worker cooperatives also have a theoretical
downside. The concern is that workers irrationally overvalue the benefits from ownership
and thereby form worker cooperatives too often, when they would be better off working for
an investor-owned firm. Nittai K. Bergman & Dirk Jenter, Employee Sentiment and Stock
Option Compensation, 84 J. FIN. EcoN. 667, 669 (2007) (finding workers overvalue
ownership stakes in their employers); Shlomo Benartzi, Excessive Extrapolation and the
Allocation of 401(k) Accounts to Company Stock 56 J. FIN. 1747, 1748-49 (2001) (same).
Although many commentators think worker cooperatives do not form often enough, not that
they form too often, the idea is important to keep in mind when considering potential policy
reforms in Part V See, eg., Dow, supa note 79, at 41 (arguing that the current number of
worker cooperatives is too low); Schwartz, supr note 7, at 283 (same).
89. These cooperatives are roughly 92% of all cooperatives by number and $450
billion in annual revenue. Deller et al., supra note 9, at 11.
90. The Federal Reserve processes approximately half of all electronic automated
clearing house transactions, with the bulk of the remainder processed by a private
organization cooperatively owned by its member banks, including Bank of America,
Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo. See About TCIA CLEARINGHOUSE, https://
www.theclearinghouse.org/about-tch (last visited Mar. 22, 2014).
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clubs, life insurers, and housing." They also provide positive
externality goods9 2 and, like worker cooperatives, can provide a
nonfinancial ownership motivation such as with a cooperatively owned
grocery store."
But they are also particularly apt at solving information
asymmetries. When customers cannot easily verify the quality of a
good, a seller has reason to exploit the customer and sell low-quality
goods at high prices. Regulation solves some of the problem, setting
minimum-quality floors or mandating disclosure of various key
attributes. Reputation or a customer's prior experience also constrains
opportunism. Yet considerable gaps can remain between buyer and
seller information. Property insurance companies, for example, have
substantial leeway between what regulators require or what would hurt
their reputation and how they treat their customers.94 Even consumer
goods manufacturers can disguise the quality of their goods without
losing significant business."
If the seller is owned by its customers, this incentive is largely
eliminated. The cooperative form acts as a commitment to refrain
from exploiting the cooperative's customer-owners. Because the
opportunity for seller opportunism arises in so many circumstances, so
too do cooperatives. Cooperatives succeed in consumer retail,"
91. See HANSMANN, supm note 12, at 157-58, 169-70, 190, 199, 268-70. Purchasing
cooperatives like health insurance purchasers and the United Foodservice Purchasing Co-Op
also form to aggregate purchasers into a pool that can counteract a seller's market power.
92. Property insurance and agriculture cooperatives have been active here. Property
insurance mutuals pioneered several fire-reduction methods and regularly engaged in
educating their policyholders about loss prevention. JOHN BAINBRIDGE, BIOGRAPHY OF AN
IDEA: THE STORY OF MUTUAL FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE 129-30 (1952) (slow-burning
floors and roofs); id. at 195-96 (public education); HEFLEBOWER, supra note 40, at 166
(general fire prevention). Indeed, the president of one mutual was so annoyingly active in
promoting automatic sprinklers that he was told to "be sure to take a sprinkler with him when
he died ... and went to where a sprinkler would help protect him." BAINBRIDGE, supra, at
131 (internal quotation marks omitted). For discussion of agriculture cooperative activities,
see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
93. Marilyn Scholl, Membership Is Ownership. The Cooperative Advantage, Coon.
GROCER NETWORK (May-June 2008), http://www.cooperativegrocer.coop/articles/2009-01-
19/membership-ownership.
94. See Daniel Schwarcz, Diffemntial Compensation and the "Race to the Bottom "in
ConsumerInsurnce Markets, 15 CONN. INs. L.J. 723, 745 (2009).
95. This manufacturer opportunism drove the creation of REI, a consumer
cooperative that sells recreational equipment. Andy Ryan, Who Owns REI. SEATTLE WKLY.
NEws (Oct. 9, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.seattleweekly.com/2003-06-18/news/who-owns-
rei/.
96. Id. (recreational equipment); HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 150-51 (agricultural
supply purchasers).
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housing," life insurance," and property insurance,' all of which can
involve information asymmetries. Similarly, when customers have
private information that the seller cannot verify, customers have less
reason to exploit the seller when they collectively own the seller. For
this reason, credit unions, "housing,'o' and property insurance 02
97. With housing, owners have less incentive to keep the premises at a high level if
doing so cannot be easily verified by tenants. HANSMANN, supm note 12, at 199.
98. A risk with life insurance is that the insurance company will not have sufficient
assets to pay claims in the future-a risk that is extremely difficult for policyholders to cover
by contract. Id. at 267-68. Modem solvency regulation mitigates this risk today, but leaves
other risks intact, such as whether an insurer will deal honestly with policyholders or
expeditiously handle claims.
99. BAINBRIDGE, supm note 92, at 154, 169-70. Historically, rural policyholders had
great difficulty in identifying good policies from bad, which drove them to patronize mutuals
exclusively. Id. at 169-70. As with life insurance, the worst property insurance opportunism
has been curbed by regulation, but the potential for other abuses still remains, such as with
the insurer's claims management practices. For instance, the three highest-rated homeowners
insurers (Amica, USAA, and Auto-Owners Insurance) and the four highest automobile
insurers (NJM Insurance, USAA, Amica, and Auto-Owners Insurance), as determined by
Consumer Repors, are all mutuals, as is the highest-rated homeowners insurer, and the
highest-rated automobile insurer in six of eight regions, as determined by J.D. Power. Protect
Your Home, CONSUMER REP., Sept. 2012, at 24 (homeowners insurers); Save on Car
Insurance, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2010, at 34 (automobile insurers); Press Release, 2012 US.
National Homeowners Insurance Study, J.D. POWER & Assocs. (Sept. 27, 2012), http://
www.jdpower.com/content/press-release/ujOQpsp/2012-u-s-national-homeowners-insurance-
study.htm (homeowners insurers); Press Release, 2012 US. Auto Insurance Study, J.D.
POWER & Assocs. (June 25, 2012), http://www.jdpower.com/content/press-release/Ne5o7yal
2012/u-s-auto-insurance.study.htm (automobile insurers).
100. Borrowers may be tempted to gamble loans on risky projects once receiving a
loan. When the borrower is also an owner of the bank, her incentive to impose costs on the
bank is reduced. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 2 59-60.
101. Like landlords, tenants have reason to skimp on maintenance if the landlord
cannot easily verify quality. Id at 199.
102. As with credit unions, mutual insurance companies allow the policyholder to
commit to reducing future losses if the policyholder cares about co-owners' welfare. Early
mutual property insurers provide anecdotal evidence for this contention. Patricia Born et al.,
Organizational Form and Insurance Company Performance: Stocks versus Mutuals, mn THE
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY INSURANCE 167, 172 (David F Bradford ed., 1998)
(describing policyholders in property insurance mutuals declining to collect on claims for
smaller losses); S.S. HUEBNER & KENNETH BLACK, JR., PROPERTY INSURANCE 507 (4th ed.
1957); VN. VALGREN, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., BULLETIN No. 530: THE ORGANIZATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF A FARMERS' MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY 3 (1917). This type of
behavior is not confined to property insurers. See PATRICIA LLOYD WILLIAMS, THE CFC
STORY: How AMERICA'S RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES INTRODUCED WALL STREET TO
MAIN STREET 101 (1995) (describing customers of electric cooperatives who read their own
meters to reduce the cooperative's expenses).
Further, early insurers refused to insure individuals who were "moral hazards," meaning
those of doubtful moral character. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy ofMom Hazarc( 75 TEX.
L. REv 237, 252-55 (1996). Those without high moral character likely also could not be
counted upon to care about reducing community-wide losses.
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cooperatives can have special advantages that their investor-owned
counterparts cannot."'
4. Drawing It Together: What Matters for Cooperative Ownership
Cooperatives' existing success shows their advantages can be
significant and diverse. They arise in situations of market-contracting
imperfections, where market power or information asymmetries
persist, acting as a commitment mechanism that reduces opportunistic
behavior among buyers and sellers. They also provide positive
externality goods to their owners and facilitate the sharing of positive
externality goods that owners independently develop. 10 Finally,
cooperatives organize where cooperative owners get unique benefits
from ownership, such as when worker-owners derive satisfaction from
collectively owning the employer that carries over into their on-the-job
performance." In all these cases, opening up ownership to a broad
group of patrons creates these benefits.
The following Table summarizes estimates of select cooperatives'
current economic presence and shows where they have had the most
success in solving these market failures.
103. Like producer cooperatives, consumer cooperatives present the troubling prospect
of facilitating anticompetitive behavior by consumers, who might band together into a
"purchasing cooperative" to reduce prices of purchased inputs below market levels.
Purchasing cooperatives appear with relative frequency with investor-owned firms as the
cooperative's owners. They have also arisen in health insurance, where individuals aggregate
to exercise buying power. Elliot K. Wicks, Health Insurance Purhashig Cooperatives,
COMMONWEALTH FuND (Nov. 11, 2002), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/
Issue-Briefs/2002/Nov/Health-Insurance-Purchasing-Cooperatives.aspx; About Us, Coop.
NETWORK, http://www.cooperativenetwork.coop/wm/coopcare/web/coopcare.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014).
But like producer cooperatives, such concerns about cooperative market power may be
more theory than reality. Suppliers to a buyer with monopsony power will shift to other
methods of gainful employment, because the buyers are paid a below-competitive price. This
diminishes the supply available to the buyer with monopsony power, who then has to raise
prices to the remaining suppliers to obtain enough inputs, attenuating its monopsony power
over longer time horizons. Cf V Bhaskar et al., Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competion
in Labor Markets; 16 J. EcoN. PERSP. 155, 156 (2002) (examining the persistence of
monopsony power when suppliers cannot easily switch to other markets).
Nevertheless, the potential for anticompetitive behavior exists, which should be kept in
mind during the discussion of proposals for reform, infia Part V
104. See Scholl, supra note 93; Ryan, supra note 95.
105. See sources cited suprd notes 97-99.
106. SeeArtz & Kim, supra note 82, at 15.
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Table 1107
Type Number Gross Revenue Market Share
(a mil)
Farm 2,547 119,039 27% market share of supplies and
Supply/Marketing of marketing
Biofuels 39 9,405
Grocery 290 2,098
Arts and Crafts 305 94
Other Retail & Service 282 59,981
(hardware, coffee
shops, book stores)
Health Care 305 5,157
Childcare 1,096 161
Housing 9,471 - 7% of nation's housing; 25% of
multiunit housing
Transportation 49 302
Education 390 753
Credit Unions 8,334 40,088 10% market share of household
savings; 8.5% of consumer
market loans; 10% of
nonrevolving consumer market
loans
Insurance 1,497 187,343 17% of all life-related premiums
written (36% of all ordinary life
insurance premiums written);
27% of all property and casualty
premiums written (39/ of
homeowners' premiums written;
33% of private passenger auto
premiums written)
Cooperative Credit 147 84,575
Suppliers (Farm Credit:
Cooperative Banks)
Electric (G&T and 920 34,275 13% of customers; 5% of
Distribution) generation; 6% of transmission
Telephone 255 2,412 1
Water 3,350 2,170
Cooperatives' ability to solve these market failures results from patron-
owners' dual entitlement to control the firm and to the firm's residual
107. Data except market share are from Deller et al., supm note 9. Information on
market share is from Coopemdve Information Report 1: Faun Marketing, Supply and
Service Coopemdve Historical Statistics, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RURAL Div. 79 (Aug. 2004),
http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/cirls26.pdf (farm supply and marketing); U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, American Housing Survey for the United States: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 1
(Mar. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011 pubs/hl50-09.pdf (housing); Monthly Credit
Union Estimates, CREDIT UNION NAT'L Ass'N 9-10 (Jan. 2014), http://www.cuna.org/
Research-And-Strategy/Credit-Union-Data-And-Statistics/ (select Monthly Credit Union
Estimates) (credit unions); calculations from BEST' S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES,
LIFE/HEALTH, UNITED STATES & CANADA 5, 13 (2012) (life insurance); calculations from
BEST'S AGGREGATES & AVERAGES, PROPERTY/CASUALTY, UNITED STATES & CANADA 146,
211 (2012) (property/casualty insurance); US. Co-Ops by the Numbers, NAT'L RURAL ELEC.
Coop. ASS'N, http://www.nreca.coop/about-electric-cooperatives/co-op-facts-figures/u-s-co-
ops-by-the-numbers/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (electricity).
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profits. These requirements are markedly broader than the seven
cooperative principles outlined earlier.' Which, if any, of these
principles are truly necessary for a cooperative's success at solving
market failures?
In addition to the rights of control and residual assets, a
requirement can be added that residual assets be distributed to patron-
owners proportional to their use of the cooperative. This requirement
is important for several reasons. If one owner were entitled to an
outsized portion of profits, the cooperative's potential to solve market
failures begins to collapse. The owner who receives a disproportionate
share of profits has reason to push the cooperative to exercise its
market power or exploit information asymmetries over other patron-
owners, since the dominant owner gains at their expense by doing so.'o
That owner also benefits less by the cooperative's provision of positive
externality goods to other patron-owners."' Moreover, as other patron-
owners' profit interests shrink relative to their business with the
cooperative, they have more reason to exploit any asymmetric
information. Finally, other patron-owners' nonfinancial motivation
from ownership will likely decrease as they see their efforts
disproportionally accruing to the dominant owner."' When profits
accrue disproportionately to use, the cooperative's commitment
mechanism breaks down, making the firm resemble an investor-owned
firm with additional costs from being a cooperative."'
When the membership class includes most or all of the suppliers,
workers, or customers, the cooperative's benefits also grow. Again, if
the cooperative is owned by only some of its suppliers, workers, or
customers, its ability to solve market failures diminishes. A
cooperative owned by only half its workers, for example, still has
reason to exercise its market power and information advantages over
the remaining half, while it loses incentive to supply them with
positive externality goods."'
108. See supr note 47 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., KATRINA V BERMAN, WORKER-OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIEs: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIs 111, 113 (1967) (identifying the problem of worker-owners' profit
interest being disproportional to work performed as the driving failure of several worker
cooperatives).
110. See id at I11 (describing some promoters' expected benefits that are unrelated to
the provision of positive externality goods to other patron-owners).
111. See genemdly sources cited supra note 86 (discussing this advantage of
cooperative ownership).
112. Seeinfia Part m.C (costs of cooperative form).
113. One can thus see that a sole proprietorship represents a "cooperative" with a
restricted patron-owner class of one, with no benefits from the cooperative form.
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A cooperative can therefore be visualized along a continuum. At
the extreme that maximizes the cooperative's potential benefits, a
broad class of patron-owners shares profits proportional to use.' 14 As
the patron-owner class narrows, or as a single owner gains a
disproportionate share of profits, the cooperative's advantages
diminish, although they may still remain. At the other extreme, with a
single individual patron-owner who keeps all the firm's profits, the
"cooperative's" ability to solve market failures has been lost, and what
is left resembles an investor-owned firm.
The Table and discussion reveal several instances of market
failure that cooperatives have yet to address. Existing producer and
consumer cooperatives on occasion expand to provide positive
externality goods to their members, yet cooperatives do not form to
offer these goods in the first instance, instead serving them as a by-
product of other operations. Producer cooperatives outside agriculture
are rare, despite seller market power that could favor their formation."'
Nor do producer cooperatives solve information asymmetries.
Furthermore, almost no worker cooperatives organize unless mandated
by regulation, even though their promise of solving market-contracting
imperfections is great."' And many noncooperative insurers and banks
operate despite their cooperative counterparts' potential for resolving
information asymmetries.
Why have cooperatives not taken over every situation of market
imperfection? Recall that there are not just benefits associated with
any ownership form, but also costs. The conventional explanation,
therefore, is that the costs of cooperative ownership (including the
forgone benefits of not choosing investor ownership) outweigh
benefits in these instances."' The next Subpart lays out these costs of
cooperative ownership. It then rejects them as being an incomplete
explanation, showing how these costs do not fully explain patterns in
cooperative ownership. This sets the stage for the heart of the
114. I have not yet touched on voting rights. The seven cooperative principles require
democratic control. As a practical matter, democratic control will ensure a single owner does
not capture an outsized portion of profits. It need not be the only way of guaranteeing this
outcome, however; absent a single majority patron-owner, voting rights proportional to use
should achieve the same effect. Democratic control, however, may bring other benefits,
particularly a maximization of ownership's nonfinancial motivational force. See generally
sources cited supra note 86.
115. SeeHANsMANN, supra note 12, at 142; Deller et al., supm note 9, at 11.
116. SeeArtz & Kim, supra note 82, at 2.
117. See infia Part II.C.
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discussion: cooperatives are comparatively rare because they are
difficult to form.
C Cooperative Costs
The costs of cooperative ownership relative to investor ownership
fall broadly into two categories: higher financing costs and higher
costs of decision making."' In both these areas, cooperatives' costs are
expected to be higher than investor ownership's costs.
First, all firms need financing, and cooperatives will have higher
costs of financing their operations than investor-owned firms. This
financing could come exclusively from market contracting for debt;
however, as a practical matter, firms need equity."' Both cooperatives
and investor-owned firms draw equity from their owners, but
118. Left out of this discussion is whether cooperatives' agency costs differ from those
of investor-owned firms. Agency costs arise whenever an agent is not the sole beneficiary of
her own efforts. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory ofthe Fim: Managenal
Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976). In
firms, they arise when owners (principals) delegate tasks to management (agents). These
costs are sometimes supposed to be more severe with cooperatives over investor-owned
firms, since cooperatives lack the takeover threat that keeps investor-owned firms honest
because cooperative ownership generally cannot be aggregated by a potential acquirer. Marc
Schneiberg, Organiadonal Heterogeneity and the Production ofNew Forms: Politics, Social
Movements and Mutual Companies n American Fire Insurance, 1900-1930, in 19 RESEARCH
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS REVISITED
39, 51-52 (Michael Lounsbury & Marc J. Ventresca eds., 2002). Nevertheless, cooperative
member-owners are largely free to terminate their relationship with the cooperative, making
the threat of exit a constraint on management activity. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN,
ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES To DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES
(1970) (broadly discussing exit, or the prospect of exit, as a deterrent to abuse by
management); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Exit, Voice, and Liability: The
Evolution of Organizational Law (June 2008) (on file with author) (discussing similar
principles in the context of organizational reform specifically). Further, the special
relationship many cooperative owners derive from ownership, combined with the important
role of the cooperative's profits in many members' livelihood, can lead cooperative owners to
monitor management more closely than owners of the investor-owned firm might. See
sources cited supra note 86 (discussing nonfinancial rewards of ownership); Henry
Hansmann, Coopelative Firms in Theory and Pmctice, 4 FINNISH J. BUS. ECON. 387, 397-98
(1999). But see J.A.C. Hetherington, Fact v Fiction: Who Owns Mutual Insurance
Companies, 1969 Wis. L. REv 1068, 1083 (finding a low voting rate in election of directors
by owners of large mutual insurers). Whether agency costs are therefore on balance more or
less severe with cooperatives depends on firm-specific characteristics, making generalized
conclusions inappropriate to draw.
119. Because equity is subordinate to debt, investor financing with equity provides a
cushion for debt holders against bankruptcy that lowers borrowing costs. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 504-05 (1913); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2012) (bankruptcy priority
rules); Jensen & Meckling, supa note 118, at 333-43.
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cooperatives' costs of doing so are higher for two reasons.120 One,
because cooperatives get equity only from their patrons, instead of the
much broader investing public, the pool of potential equity
contributors to cooperatives is smaller and necessarily raises capital
costs. Two, a cooperative's pool of potential capital contributions is
less diversified than is an investor-owned firm's, because both the
patron's equity contribution and the patron's production, job, or
consumption are tied to the cooperative's existence. Poor
diversification necessarily increases costs of equity.12'
In addition to higher capital costs, cooperatives also in theory
have higher decision-making costs. Investor-owners generally share a
unified goal: maximize the firm's financial profits.'22 The goal is
specific and relatively straightforward to measure, making it easy for
owners to decide on a course of action for their firm. Cooperative
owners, however, can be more heterogeneous in their desires,
reflecting heterogeneous patron relationships.'23 The course of action
for the cooperative that most benefits one patron-owner might not be
the one that most benefits another. This heterogeneity makes it more
difficult for owners to agree on how to direct the firm. For example,
Vanguard owners holding only international funds may want Vanguard
to reduce associated fees with that fund to $0 and raise other funds'
fees, while owners holding other funds would feel differently.'24
Getting these owners to agree on a common course may be
complicated and costly.
Therefore, by conventional arguments, the reason cooperatives
succeed in many of the examples surveyed above is because the
benefits from solving market failures are extensive with relatively
small costs, either because the cooperative does not operate in a
capital-intensive industry or because it takes steps to address owner
heterogeneity.' Applying the evolutionary theory, the fact that these
120. Since a cooperative's equity costs will be higher, it will favor debt over equity
compared to an equivalent investor-owned firm. Relatively lower equity, however, increases
default risk, so debt costs are also higher.
121. See STEPHEN A. ROSS ETAL., CORPORATE FINANCE 246 (7th ed. 2005).
122. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 62-63.
123. The focus here is on heterogeneous patron relationships, because cooperatives
largely remove heterogeneity from the investor relationship. See sources cited supra note 50.
124. These conflicts can also come up if investor-owners share a patron relationship
with a firm, such as if investor-owners of Fidelity also hold Fidelity mutual funds. But these
relationships are a necessary feature of cooperatives, while they are optional for investor-
owned firms.
125. A common method for reducing this heterogeneity for producer cooperatives is to
have operations that use mostly a single input, while worker cooperatives may have
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cooperatives succeed over the long term suggests that their benefits
outweigh costs.
Conventional explanations then go a step further: cooperatives
do not succeed in unexploited areas because their costs would be
greater than their incremental benefits. For example, customers do not
collectively own car manufacturers because the resultant capital costs
and decision-making difficulties would be high, and any benefits from
avoided market power or information asymmetries or provision of
positive externality goods would be small. The fact that cooperatives
are not seen in these other industries over the long term is taken to be
evidence that their costs outweigh benefits. It is this extension that is
not appropriate.
D Problems with Extending the Evolutionary Theory
The problem with using the evolutionary theory as justification
for cooperative success is that it requires one of two assumptions to be
true. First, it must be the case that new firms choose whichever
ownership form maximizes owners' ongoing benefits. In that
circumstance, with competing types of firms present or equally able to
be present, ownership types compete with each other, and the long-
term dominance by one could accurately be explained as that form's
ability to maximize benefits of ownership.' Or second, it must be the
case that converting from one type of ownership to another can be
done at low cost. In that circumstance, since a firm could convert to
cooperative ownership when it is more efficient, if firms within a
market systematically start and remain investor-owned, it again is
evidence that investor ownership is superior.
Both assumptions are violated, as Part IV will show. When that
happens, applications of the evolutionary theory break down, because
competing types of ownership are not on equal footing. Investor-
owned firms can maintain a long-term presence in certain markets
even when cooperatives would outcompete them, because barriers to
cooperative formation deter cooperatives from ever entering.m' This
employee-owners who share a common job type and pay, and consumer cooperatives may
sell a single type of good. Another way of managing owner heterogeneity is to delegate more
decisions to management, potentially raising agency costs. See John Morley, The Separdon
ofFunds and Manageis: A Theory ofInvestment Fund Structure and Regulaton, 123 YALE
L.J. 1228 (2014) (discussing the case of Vanguard); see also discussion supm note 118.
126. See, e.g., Schwartz, supm note 7, at 223 (studying this in the worker-owned firm
context).
127. SeekL'fiaPartIV
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explanation addresses several anomalies with existing patterns of
cooperative operations, which I discuss in detail in Part IVC.
When cooperatives are more difficult to form, the evolutionary
theory still has explanatory power. Long-term observed cooperative
success indicates not the only areas in which cooperative ownership is
superior, but instead shows the areas where cooperatives either are so
much more efficient that their benefits overcome their formation
barriers or else have relatively low barriers to formation. The absence
of cooperatives from particular markets, however, cannot be taken as
conclusive evidence of their inferiority.
IV. BARRIERS TO COOPERATIVE FORMATION
Analyses of relative efficiencies between cooperatives and
investor-owned firms either assume that firms initially choose the
form that maximizes ongoing benefits"' or that ownership can be
switched between cooperative and investor-owned at low expense
relative to potential savings.'29 In general, neither is the case. This Part
argues that cooperatives are difficult to form, either in the first instance
or via conversion of an existing firm, relative to investor-owned firms.
Firms do not initially start as cooperatives because the entrepreneur
must provide an unsubsidized public good, and conversion costs-
particularly coordination difficulties-discourage most firms from
converting to cooperatives. The implication of these difficulties is that
cooperatives will not always appear, even when they are the efficient
ownership form.
128. Almost without exception, literature on cooperatives assumes their existence
exogenously and does not inquire into difficulties behind their formation. See Svend Albck
& Christian Schultz, On the Relative Advantage of Cooperatives, 59 ECON. LETrERS 397
(1998); Jon Elster, From Here to There; Or If Coopeative Ownershp Is So Desiable, Why
Are There So Few Cooperatives., i SocLIUsM 93, 108-09 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds.,
1989); Peter Helmberger & Sidney Hoos, Cooperative Enterpnse and Organization Theory,
44 J. FARM ECON. 275 (1962); Hendrikse, supra note 72; Richard J. Sexton, The Formation of
Cooperatives: A Game-Theoretic Approach with Implications for Cooperative Finance,
Decision Making, and Stability, 68 AM. J. AGRIC. EcON. 214 (1986); Berit Tennbakk,
Markethig Cooperatives in Mired Duopolies, 46 J. AGRIC. EcON. 33 (1995); Oliver Hart &
John Moore, Cooperatives vs. Outside Ownership (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 6421, 1988), http://www.nber.org/papers/w6421; Patrick Herbst & Jens Prifer,
Firms, Nonprofits, and Cooperatives: A Theory of Organizational Choice (CentER
Discussion Paper No. 2007-07, 2011), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=
734125. The lone exception that examines the difficulty in forming cooperatives at length is
Schwartz, supra note 7, who restricts his attention to the particular case of worker
cooperatives.
129. HANsMANN, supra note 12, at 45-46. Hansmann notes that switching costs are
likely low relative to the value of the firm. However, the important comparison is switching
costs relative to the savings from the new ownership form.
2014] 929
TULANE LAWREVIEW
The following Subparts show why firms rarely start as or convert
to cooperatives even when cooperative ownership would be more
efficient. I then present empirical evidence consistent with this
framework that cannot easily be explained by conventional accounts
and then turn to implications for the shareholder primacy theory of
corporate governance.
A. Entrepreneurs: Public Goods Problem
For purposes of this discussion, recall first that in a cooperative, a
class of patrons shares the firm's profits and control rights, with the
former proportional to use and the latter often via a one-member, one-
vote mechanism.' This sharing of ownership benefits drives the
cooperative's ability to overcome the market failures of market power,
information asymmetries, externality goods, and non-financial-
ownership motivation. Unfortunately, these attributes are also the
biggest impediments to cooperative formation by prospective patron-
owners.
Consider an entrepreneur with a new business idea. Suppose she
has developed a new method of producing widgets, allowing her to sell
them at a profit of $Pper widget. The upfront costs that must be spent
before any widgets can be produced are $F perhaps consisting of the
expense for setting up a widget factory. If she structures the enterprise
as a sole proprietorship in which she keeps all the earnings, the
entrepreneur could make $Pper unit in profits while risking $Ffor the
factory. If instead the entrepreneur organized the firm as a successful
cooperative, she shares the start-up factory expenses, but she also
shares the profits. As long as the project is expected to have a positive
payout so that $P is greater than $F the entrepreneur maximizes
expected financial returns by maximizing her ownership stake.
Key for the entrepreneur, however, is that she usually cannot take
a disproportionate profit share if she starts the firm as a cooperative.
This is because the cooperative's advantages accrue only as long as
owners' profit shares are proportional to their use of the cooperative.''
If an entrepreneur organized a dairy-buying cooperative but kept half
its profits despite accounting for only 1% of its inputs, she has reason
to drive the cooperative to behave like an investor-owned firm that
exploits other patron-owners.' Since the cooperative could not
130. See supra Part III.A.
131. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text. If the entrepreneur could not
influence the cooperative's management, then the cooperative's commitment mechanism
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credibly commit to refrain from exploiting member-owners, the firm
then functions like an investor-owned firm but with the disadvantages
of a cooperative, explaining why so few cooperatives with
disproportional profit distributions exist.
Therefore, even if the cooperative promises higher total ongoing
owner profits, the entrepreneur will not choose the form because her
share of those profits is comparatively low. In this way, starting a
cooperative is analogous to supplying a public good: the entrepreneur
must share the profits from ownership among other member-owners."'
However, initial entrepreneurs of investor-owned firms routinely
are compensated for their entrepreneurial activity through sizable
shares of the firm's future profits. Why is this effective for the
investor-owned firm but not the cooperative? As a cooperative
entrepreneur's share of the cooperative's profits grows, the
entrepreneur increasingly benefits by having the cooperative exploit
the patron relationship, undermining the cooperative's advantages.
This arises because cooperative owners maximize the combination of
their patron relationship and their owner relationship, and with a
cooperative the owner profits can grow at the patron relationship's
expense when they become decoupled through disproportionate profit
might remain intact. But in that case, it is likely the cooperative owners would collectively
vote to reduce the entrepreneur's profit share, which the entrepreneur would be powerless to
block. See, eg., Great Rivers Coop. of Se. Iowa v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 198 F.3d 685, 692-
95 (8th Cir. 1999) (involving a situation where majority members voted to diminish the
financial stake of older members). The entrepreneur, recognizing this probability, would
never start the cooperative in the first place. When the entrepreneur's profit share and input
share are the same, however, she no longer benefits by having the cooperative exploit its
patron-owners.
133. Public goods are nonrivalrous (one person's use does not hurt another's) and
nonexcludable (nonpaying users cannot be denied access). MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note
54, at 359. The entrepreneur's activity is nonrivalrous, because the presence of co-owners
does not decrease her utility (in fact, co-owners enhance the cooperative's profits). It is also
nonexcludable, since cooperative ownership is generally open to new member-owners who
usually do not compensate the original entrepreneur for her upfront legwork. The
entrepreneur remains uncompensated because she cannot receive a disproportionate profit
share as compensation for the reasons discussed above. In theory, the entrepreneur could
receive a fixed wage or other compensation untethered to the cooperative's income for her
efforts, assuming the cooperative was successful. This happens in limited circumstances.
See BERMAN, supra note 109, at 110 (discussing compensation for some initial plywood
cooperative organizers). But most of the time, organizers are never paid for their efforts.
This could be because accurate compensation unrelated to the cooperative's future income is
difficult to quantify at the formative stage. Or, perhaps entrepreneurs interested in
compensation are usually better off starting an investor-owned firm and taking a higher profit
share rather than being compensated by a low share plus a fixed wage that is not tied to the
firm's success. See Robert Cropp, Starting a New Generation Cooperative, in A
COOPERATIVE APPROACH To LOCAL EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 25, 26 (Christopher D. Merrett
& Norman Walzer eds., 2001); supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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shares. In contrast, the entrepreneur of an investor-owned firm has
only a single relationship with the firm: that of an owner. Thus, as this
entrepreneur's share of profits grows, the entrepreneur has less
incentive for the firm to exploit its owners, because doing so
increasingly harms the entrepreneur.134 Disproportionate profit shares
thus act to reassure other owners of the investor-owned firm
entrepreneur's legitimacy, while at the same time compensating the
entrepreneur for her efforts. On the other hand, they act to undermine
the cooperative entrepreneur's legitimacy.'
If the profits and the value of the firm are the same whether it is
organized as a cooperative or an investor-owned firm, it is not
troubling when the cooperative does not organize. Consider the case,
however, when there are incremental benefits from the cooperative
through its ability to solve market-contracting failures. What if the
cooperative now produces $P+Q of profit per unit (perhaps because
producers supply particularly high-quality inputs, workers work harder,
or consumers pay more to avoid exploitation), whereas the investor-
owned firm produces only $Pper unit? From society's perspective, the
cooperative form is preferable, creating an additional $ Q of profit and
social welfare for each widget beyond the investor-owned firm. But
because the profit-maximizing entrepreneur can receive a greater share
of the investor-owned firm's profits, she will organize an investor-
owned firm unless Qis very high relative to P
If entrepreneurs fully internalized social welfare when starting a
firm, there would be no issue. The entrepreneur would choose the
cooperative form when it maximizes social welfare even if her
personal financial returns were lower. But, in fact, almost all
134. Similarly, if the entrepreneur is also an employee compensated by a wage, the
entrepreneur has more reason to maximize the firm's profits (at the expense of relaxed
working conditions, perhaps) as her profit interest grows.
135. Others have argued that a collective action problem is what prevents most
cooperatives from starting. See Schwartz, supm note 7, at 225. This problem was
prominently identified by Mancur Olson as the reason why groups often fail to coordinate to
achieve group-maximizing outcomes, since it is often individually rational for individuals to
break from the group. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROuPs 48 (1971). While the costs of coordinating fellow cooperative
owners may be nontrivial, see ifia notes 159-161 and accompanying text, they are not the
main reason that cooperatives fail to form, since they go only to the entrepreneur's ability to
share the start-up cost $Famong others. Even when the collective action costs are $0, as I
have implicitly assumed in the example above, the entrepreneur will not choose the
cooperative form because her share of profits will be small.
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entrepreneurs seek to maximize only their personal financial profits."'
The University of Michigan's Panel Study of Entrepreneurial
Dynamics conducted a large-scale survey of entrepreneurs and
documented, among other characteristics, entrepreneurs' reported
motivations when starting a firm.'" Overwhelmingly, entrepreneurs
reported personal desires for wealth and autonomy as their prime
motivators, with society-oriented measures of pursuing a personal
vision, status, respect, or concern for the community of distant
secondary importance."' Even entrepreneurs starting organizations
aimed at improving social welfare are driven by their financial self-
interest."
Why then do any cooperatives start at all? While there has been
no systematic inquiry into the motivations behind cooperative
entrepreneurs, history and the argument above show that an individual
will form a cooperative if one of two factors weighs in their favor.
First, the gains from cooperative ownership relative to investor
ownership can be sufficiently high so that the entrepreneur profits
more with cooperative ownership, even though she keeps a smaller
share of the cooperative's profits.'40 In terms of the framework above,Q must be high relative to P Second, the entrepreneur could gain
personal satisfaction from improving others' welfare in addition to her
own. In that case, the entrepreneur accounts for social welfare rather
than merely her personal financial returns when choosing an
organizational form, so that she organizes a cooperative when it has
higher total benefits than an investor-owned firm.
Together, these factors account for the formation of many
cooperatives now present. Several existing cooperatives promised
136. Paul D. Reynolds & Richard T. Curtin, Business Creation in the United States:
Panel Study of Entwvpreneuial Dynamics II Aintial Assessment 4 FouND. & TRENDS
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 155, 195-96 (2008).
13 7. Id.
138. Id These reports are consistent with most models of entrepreneurial activity,
which assume firm creation is motivated by the prospect of financial profits. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF EcoNOMIC DEVELOPMENT 128-38 (Redvers Opie
trans., 1934); PA. Geroski, What Do We Know About Entry?, 13 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 421,
427-35 (1995) ("Virtually all of these presume that entry will be proportional to expected
post-entry profits defined net of the costs of entry.").
139. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. York et al., Selective Incentives, Entrepreneurship, and
Identity Toward a Behavioral Theory of Collective Action 16-17 (June 23, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing role of profits in motivating
entrepreneurs of renewable energy); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-for-Profit
Entepreneurs, 81 J. PUB. EcoN. 99 (2001) (developing a model to explain formation of
nonprofits by profit-maximizing entrepreneurs).
140. See supm Part II.B.
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higher personal returns to entrepreneurs than the entrepreneurs could
achieve by starting an investor-owned firm, explaining their choice of
the cooperative form. 4' For example, with many of the agricultural-
producer cooperatives discussed above that organized in response to
market power, the only viable option for new entrepreneurs was to start
a cooperative.42 In these cases, P was close to $0 while Q was an
appreciable positive number, so the only realistic way entrepreneurs
could profit was to organize as a cooperative.143 Several consumer
cooperatives also form for the same reason, particularly the large
number of wholesale purchasing cooperatives that leverage purchasing
power of individual members to generate their own market power."
Other cooperatives have socially oriented entrepreneurs seeking
to maximize the collective good at the expense of forgone personal
financial returns. 14' Entrepreneurs who care about broader social
welfare beyond their own personal financial returns might organize a
cooperative even if they could earn more money by starting an
investor-owned firm, because these entrepreneurs' value of social
returns may outweigh their forgone financial return. 146 These
individuals have organized several agriculture cooperatives, worker
cooperatives, and insurers.147 While their impacts can be substantial,
such entrepreneurs are rare.
141. RuBLE, supm note 51, at 105-08.
142. Id
143. An entrepreneur organizing as an investor-owned firm faces the daunting
prospect of outcompeting an incumbent monopsonist. The entrepreneur also would have to
convince farmers that she would not exercise resulting monopsony power if she proved
successful. Entrepreneurs historically have had considerable difficulty in credibly making
this latter commitment, leading farmers to boycott entrant firms and making organizing as a
new investor-owned firm unprofitable. See id.
144. An entrepreneur organizing such a business as an investor-owned firm faces the
same difficulties as the entrepreneur discussed supra note 143. See generally HEFLEBOWER,
supra note 40, at 121-22 (purchasing cooperatives with investor-owned firms as members).
145. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 274.
146. See PAuL C. LIGHT, THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1-11 (2008)
(discussing the characteristics necessary for social entrepreneurs).
147. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 92, at 78 (property insurers); RuBLE, supra note 51, at
12-14 (describing the sacrifices made by organizer of butter cooperatives that were the
precursor to Land O'Lakes); Cropp, supa note 133, at 26 (stressing the need in organizing
cooperatives for a "champion [who] will make great sacrifices in committing the necessary
time to providing leadership for the organizational process"); Ryan, supra note 95 (noting that
REI's founder organized as a cooperative because he "wouldn't want to make money off [his]
friends"); Schwartz, supma note 7, at 274-76 (worker cooperatives); Paul B. Trescott, John
Bernard Tayler and the Development of Cooperatives in China, 1917-1945, 64 ANNALS PUB.
& COOPERATIVE ECON. 209, 212 (1993) (various cooperatives throughout China).
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Still other cooperatives combine the two. Many cooperatives
start along networks or community ties, such as cooperatives
organizing around a common religion or employer,148 where individuals
care about the group's welfare. These entrepreneurs might therefore be
more inclined to select the cooperative form, and its member-owners
might more often make sacrifices for the cooperative's good, raising
Q.49 This model fits several mutual property insurance companies and
credit unions.'
Nevertheless, many instances in which cooperatives might be the
efficient ownership form can fall through the considerable gaps among
these situations. An efficient cooperative might never start because the
entrepreneur's share of cooperative profits does not exceed her return
from organizing as an investor-owned firm, because there is no
entrepreneur who sufficiently values the collective good relative to her
private good, or because the costs of assembling fellow members are
too high. The next Subpart analyzes whether and how brokers play a
role in filling these gaps.
B. Broker Difficuldes
At first blush, brokered formation of cooperatives has promise.
After all, widely held investor-owned firms do not start out of the blue
because coordinating more than a few co-owners is costly.' Instead,
brokers are responsible for transitioning an investor-owned firm from
the initial few owners to multiple investor-owners, and from one group
Many cooperatives also started in close-knit communities with common religious or
other ties that fostered cooperative entrepreneurs, consistent with a norm of group welfare
maximization. See Schneiberg, supo note 7, at 1418.
148. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 92, at 166-72; Schneiberg, supm note 7, at 1420-21.
149. Members sharing a bond may be less inclined to exploit informational
advantages, increasing returns from cooperative ownership. See supm notes 95-103 and
accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
151. The challenge of assembling a group together in pursuit of a goal can be daunting
even when it is in each member's interest individually to do so. See generally OLSON, supM
note 135, at 46 ("[C]osts of organization are an increasing function of the number of
individuals in the group."). For instance, these costs are why property versus liability rules
often matter in tort. Difficulties in coordinating a disparate group of individuals affected by a
factory's pollution mean if they are protected by a liability right to be free from pollution, the
factory may pollute even when doing so is socially undesirable, while if they have a property
right, the factory might not. See R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1,
15-19 (1960). This holds even if the individuals would willingly pay to avoid the pollution.
For an example of this problem in action, see Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d
870 (N.Y 1970).
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of investor-owners to another.'52 When such a transfer promises
efficiency gains, the broker can extract up to the entire gain as her fee
while ensuring the new owners would still benefit from the transaction.
Capturing much of this aggregate profit ensures the broker is willing
to bear the expense of identifying and collecting new owners when
new ownership is efficient.
In principle, brokers should play a similar role in cooperative
enterprise. They should be active in starting a firm and later selling it
to existing patrons as a cooperative or in identifying and facilitating the
transfer of an existing investor-owned firm to its patrons when the
cooperative form is efficient. Since the cooperative entrepreneur has
to share much of the resulting efficiency gains with co-owners,
entrepreneurs organize too few efficient cooperatives. Because the
broker can claim much or all of the resulting efficiency gains, brokers
should be the ones starting cooperatives and converting existing firms
to cooperatives. The broker thus would solve the problem of low
financial returns that plague cooperative formation by entrepreneurs.
In practice, however, the brokering process does not work with
cooperatives. Evidence of their failure is abundantly clear. Apart from
condominiums,' cooperatives do not start from the ground up with
brokers' assistance.'54 And other than isolated cases of bankrupt or
near bankrupt firms selling to a group of their patrons,'" and again
152. With transitions to broad investor ownership, the broker often buys the firm and
then sells it to new investors. This is one function of private takeover organizations, which
purchase firms and sell pieces to the organizations' investors, as well as investment banks and
broker-dealers, which underwrite going-public transactions by buying an interest in the firm
and then selling this interest to the public. See, e g., Samuel N. Allen, A Lawyers Guide to
the Operation of Undewnting Syndicates, 26 NEw ENG. L. REv. 319, 320-21 (1991). With
transitions to more closely held investor ownership, the broker may merely find new investor-
owners who pay the old investor-owners directly, with the broker keeping efficiency gains in
the form of a commission. See, eg., Anthony J. Bocchino & Samuel H. Solomon, What
Juries Want To Hear: Methods for Developing Pensuasive Case Theory, 67 TENN. L. REv
543, 562 (2000) ("Business brokers are agents for buyers or sellers of businesses, and
generally work on a commission basis.").
153. See, e.g., Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium versus Cooperative Puzzle:
An Empical Analysis of Housmg i New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STuD. 275, 276 (2007);
HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 218. Confusingly, both "condominiums" and "cooperatives"
are cooperative methods of housing ownership, with the latter particularly popular in New
York. Condominium residents collectively own their common structure and individually own
the units, while residents of cooperatives collectively own both the structure and units. Schill
et al., supra.
154. For example, in three prominent surveys of cooperative origins, brokers' potential
for, or role in, starting a cooperative is never mentioned. See BAINBRIDGE, supM note 92;
HEFLEBOWER, supra note 40; HETHERINGION, supra note 63.
155. In the early 1900s, management and investor owners initiated the conversion of
select life insurers to customer ownership when these firms faced imminent bankruptcy or
936 [Vol. 88:899
2014] THE PUZZLING LACK OF COOPERATIVES
condominiums,' firms do not convert to cooperatives with broker
assistance. Instead, most cooperatives-even large ones-form and
convert upon the initiative of an individual entrepreneur of the type
characterized above. This is in stark contrast to widely held investor-
owned firms, which depend upon brokers to organize the ownership
base.
The precise reasons why brokering does not work with
cooperatives deserve additional academic study. It is sufficient here to
highlight its failure. However, I offer some initial speculation
regarding their conspicuous absence.
To some degree, there is a chicken and the egg problem. Because
there have been so few conversions to cooperatives in the past, brokers
often do not consider the possibility of converting a firm to a
cooperative in the future.' If there were more conversions, then
brokers might think more about doing them. But the statement just
pushes the issue back a step-why were there not more conversions of
cooperatives in the past? This question can be answered by looking at
brokers' costs of effecting a cooperative conversion, and particularly
the costs of assembling prospective cooperative owners. These costs
usually appear to outweigh incremental gains brokers might make
from converting firms to cooperatives instead of to investor-owned
firms.'58
Assembling a group of the firm's patrons together to pursue a
common goal can be costly, even when it is individually in each
member's interest to do so.'" This challenge grows when fellow
members must not only be assembled but also convinced that being in
the group is a good idea. Cooperatives represent this heightened
challenge. Since the form is unfamiliar to most, prospective patron-
owners must first be educated about what a cooperative does, how it
publicity disasters. Fletcher, supra note 30, at 22-23. Owners on occasion sell failing firms
or firms in failing industries to customers or workers. BERMAN, supra note 109, at 117-21;
HETHERINGTON, supra note 63, at 185; Alan Hyde & Craig Harnett Livingston, Employee
Takeovers, 41 RUTGERS L. REv 1131, 1132 (1989).
156. For descriptions of the process of converting to condominiums with new tenant-
owners, see Richard Chambers, Comment, Pusbed Out: A Call for Inclusionary Housing
Programs im Local Condombniun Conversion Legislation, 42 CAL. W L. REV. 355, 362-65
(2006) (describing the process in California); Eric I. Schneiderman, Cooperative and
Condominium Conversion Handbook N.Y OFFICE OF ATIORNEY GEN. (2008), http://www.
ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/COOP/2OCONDO%20Conversion%20Handb
ook.pdf (describing the process in New York).
157. This point was confirmed in conversations with individuals who lead analogous
conversions among investor-owned firms.
158. See sources cited supr note 151.
159. See sources cited supr note 151.
937
TULANE LA WREVIEW
succeeds, and that it can outcompete better-known, familiar, and
existing investor ownership competitors.'" Assembling such a class
will take time and effort, reducing the broker's expected returns."'
Additionally, it is almost always unrealistic to find a new group of
suppliers, workers, or customers to buy out an existing firm and
complete the conversion to a cooperative because a wholesale
replacement of patrons would be seriously disruptive and involve
considerable costs. A successful conversion therefore requires
convincing the existmng patrons that they value the firm most highly
and, if any significant portion is resistant, that converting to broad
cooperative ownership cannot succeed. Investors are numerous and
fungible, however, so a conversion to investor ownership requires
assembling only a small portion of the pool of willing investor-owners
and is therefore less costly and more likely.
These costs of coordinating cooperative owners explain the two
areas where brokers have had some success converting investor-owned
firms to cooperatives. The first of these is with conversions of
apartment housing to cooperative tenant-owned condominiums. These
conversions present a unique situation where new owner-tenants are
readily substituted for existing tenants, so that the typical costs of
coordinating existing patrons do not result.'62 The second area where
brokered conversion of cooperatives has had some success is in
buyouts of bankrupt or near bankrupt firms.'63 Whle existing patrons
must still be coordinated in this situation, they may be much more
receptive when the credible threat of firm dissolution looms
overhead.6"
160. Schwartz, supa note 7, at 276-77.
161. See, eg., Cropp, supra note 133, at 26 (stressing the need in organizing
cooperatives for a "champion [who] will make great sacrifices in committing the necessary
time to providing leadership for the organizational process").
Note that these costs also stand in the way of an entrepreneur's organizing a new
cooperative. See sources cited supm note 135. The entrepreneur can keep these costs low by
starting small, beginning with only a few patrons, modest operations, and relatively low
organizing costs. HEFLEBOWER, supm note 40, at 189-90. The entrepreneur can also organize
along existing networks and relationships, which facilitates the initial coordination. See supra
note 148 and accompanying text. Farmers were also often members of national
organizations, further facilitating cooperative formation among them. See, eg., BAINBRIDGE,
supra note 92, at 166-72; Schneiberg, supm note 7, at 1420-21 (discussing the role of the
Grange and the Farmers Alliance).
162. See, eg., Chambers, supra note 156; Iver Peterson, The Anatomy of a Co-Op
Conversion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1988, § 10, at 1 (describing the process behind a typical
condominium deal).
163. See sources cited supm note 155.
164. These are not the only factors at work. Probabilities also favor the firm's
converting to investor ownership. Several groups of investor-owners might buy the firm, but
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Thus, costs appear to cause brokers' failure to convert firms to
cooperatives even when cooperatives offer the highest ongoing net
benefits to owners. This means the task of forming and converting to
cooperatives falls mainly to entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, as shown
above, this reliance produces situations where cooperatives would be
efficient if organized, yet the formative step is not taken.
C What Does This Thecry Explam?
Conventional explanations use the evolutionary theory to say that
industries with significant long-term cooperative presence are those
instances (and only those instances) where cooperatives are efficient."'
These explanations implicitly assume that firms choose the ownership
form that maximizes owners' ongoing net benefits. As this Part has
shown, this assumption is violated with respect to cooperatives. The
following Subparts apply this conclusion to explain several empirical
observations of cooperative behavior that cannot be explained by
conventional applications of the evolutionary idea.
1. Lack of Cooperative Presence in High-Gains Areas
The earlier discussion of cooperative benefits and costs shows
that cooperatives should be most successful in markets where
contracting costs with a group of patrons are high, capital requirements
are low, and the patrons are relatively homogenous."' Yet several
promising markets of this sort exist with no significant cooperative
presence.
For example, artists, literary authors, and musicians face a
restricted group of buyers who routinely exercise their market power."'
in practice a maximum of only three groups might convert the firm to a cooperative: its
existing suppliers, workers, or customers. Each of these group's valuation might be randomly
distributed around the firm's true value, because valuing the firm is imprecise, involving
some subjectivity. In these circumstances, a group of investor-owners is likely to overvalue
the firm most, because there are more groups of potential investor-owners than cooperative-
owners. Thus, the firm is likely to convert to investor ownership even when it has equal value
as a cooperative. By extension, as the spread in valuation imprecision increases, the finm will
more likely convert to investor ownership even when its true value is greatest as a
cooperative.
165. See HANsMANN, supm note 12, at 22-23.
166. See supm Parts m.B-C. The extent of homogeneity required is an open question,
given examples of cooperative success despite heterogeneous owners such as REI or
Vanguard.
167. DON THOMPSON, THE $12 MILION STUFFED SHARK: THE CuRious EcoNoMICs OF
CONTEMPORARY ART 41-51 (2008) (describing the relationship between artists and dealers);
Scott Timberg, Book Pubhshing Cnsis: Capitalism Il7s Cultumr, SALON (Nov. 10, 2012,
2014] 939
TULANE LAWREVIEW
But almost no examples of producer cooperatives exist here despite the
gains they might offer from solving market power.' Producer
cooperatives also rarely organize to solve situations of asymmetric
information, such as when suppliers have superior knowledge about
the supply's quality.'" Health insurance presents instances of market
power, both buyer and seller asymmetric information, and externality
goods, but cooperative health insurers have no significant market
share.' Research and development cooperatives among firms or large
groups of individuals could solve the underprovision of goods with
positive externalities, but these, too, generally do not form."' There is
ample room for worker cooperatives in low-capital industries with
worker homogeneity, such as taxi transportation or coffee shops, yet
here, too, cooperatives rarely form despite their ability to solve all four
types of market failures.'
Comparing competing types of organizational forms shows that
cooperatives should succeed in these industries with high gains and
5:00 PM), http://www.salon.com/2012/1 1/10/book..publishing-crisiscapitalismkillsculture/
(identifying limited publishers for literary authors and musicians).
168. There are a few examples of artist cooperatives that take over the role of dealers,
showing the viability of this form, but to date it has not widely caught on. Deller et al., supm
note 9, at 15-16.
169. Such might be the case, for example, if objective yardsticks inadequately capture
the quality of inputs, as when disease is hard to detect in agricultural products or value can be
determined only later in the manufacturing process, once inputs are intermingled. See
RUBLE, supm note 51 (discussing how cooperative dairy farmers were encouraged to improve
inputs along easily measurable dimensions only); A. Troccoli et al., Durum Wheat Quality: A
Multidisciolinary Concep4 32 J. CEREAL Sci. 99 (2000) (discussing measurable dimensions
of wheat quality).
170. Cooperative health insurers' market share is approximately 1%. Carmen
DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor & Jessica C. Smith, Income, Poverty and Health
Insurance Coverage hi the United States: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 23 (Sept. 2011),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf (stating that approximately 256 million
Americans have health insurance); Harris Meyer, Feds Jump-Start Health Insurance Co-Ops
with Loans, KAISER HEALTH NEWs, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/february/
21/health-coop-cooperatives-federal-loans.aspx (last updated Feb. 22, 2012, 1:25 PM) (noting
that cooperative health insurers cover two million people).
171. This is despite federal policy recognizing an antitrust exemption for these
activities. Stephen Martin, Public Policies Towards Cooperation in Research and Develop-
men; in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL EcoNOMY 245, 267-69 (Leonard Waverman,
William S. Comanor & Akira Goto eds., 1997). When a cooperative undertakes such
research and development, it is only in the context of having organized for another purpose,
such as agricultural marketing. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. But see
Alorie Gilbert, Newsmaker: The CIOs Strike Back CNET (Apr. 29, 2004, 4:00 AM),
http://news.cnet.com/2008-1001-5201835.html (describing the organization of a software
research cooperative).
172. Although taxi cooperatives are common in other countries, particularly Sweden
and Israel, they constitute only a small portion of U.S. taxi operations. HANSMANN, supra
note 12, at 1760 (foreign cooperatives); Deller et al., supra note 9, at 33-34.
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low costs. Why have they not? A lack of financial return to the
entrepreneur who chooses the cooperative form and the ineffectiveness
of brokers provide the answer that conventional explanations cannot.
2. Strong Performance of Existing Cooperatives
Although not as comprehensive as one might hope, the limited
empirical studies on cooperative ownership versus investor ownership
performance generally suggest cooperatives have lower failure rates
than comparable investor-owned rivals, after controlling for a variety
of factors such as firm size, age, and industry."' Studies also find that
cooperatives broadly have higher measures of productivity than
comparable investor-owned firms in industries as diverse as property
insurance to credit unions, again after controlling for relevant factors.174
While the evidence is not conclusive, it is consistent with barriers
to cooperative ownership that filter out inframarginal cooperatives and
favor the formation of only the strongest and most productive
cooperatives. If cooperatives rarely organize because of the problems
discussed above, only the exceptional cooperative will be able to
overcome these barriers. In many of these cases, this will be because
the cooperative offers such significant efficiency gains over investor
173. This finding is most robust (and most studied) with respect to worker
cooperatives. See Dow, supra note 79, at 226-27 (collecting studies); Artz & Kim, suple note
82, at 19 (collecting additional studies). Although these studies control for a variety of
factors, they are not perfect. Selection effects could be an issue, whereby only individuals
highly motivated by the cooperative form choose to become owner-members of the
cooperative. Even accounting for selection effects, however, these findings suggest
unexploited cooperative opportunities unless it is the case both that cooperatives do not attract
unmotivated owner-members who capitalize on the efforts of the more motivated, and that the
pool of potential motivated owner-members has already been entirely exhausted by existing
cooperatives.
174. See, e.g., Chris Doucouliagos, Worker Partic4pation and Productivity in Labor-
Managed and Partcipatory Capitalist Fims: A Meta-Analysis 49 INDus. & LAB. REL. REV.
58, 73-74 (1995) (finding productivity positively associated with worker ownership); Dow,
supra note 79, at 182-84 (collecting several studies on worker ownership); Joseph R. Blasi et
al., Cxatng a Bigger Pie?: The Effects ofEmployee Owneshi, Profit Shating, and Stock
Options on Workplace Performance, in SHARED CAPrALiSM AT Woluc 139, 160 (Douglas L.
Kruse et al. eds., 2010); Saoia Arando et al., Efficiency in Employee-Owned Enterprises: An
Economic Case Study ofMondagon (IZA, Discussion Paper No. 5711, 2011), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstractid=1849466. But see Bonin et al., supra note 80, at 1307
(synthesizing studies that show worker ownership is positively correlated with productivity in
some circumstances but not others). Cooperatives are also found to be more productive in
some industry-specific comparisons. See Born et al., supra note 102, at 191 (insurers); Are
Mutual Insurers an Endangered Species? 3 (Swiss Re, Sigma No. 4, 1999) (insurers);
Surendra K. Kaushik & Raymond H. Lopez, Profitability of Credit Unions, Commercial
Banks and Savings Banks: A Comparative Analysis, 40 AM. EcoNOMIST 66, 76 (1996)
(credit unions).
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ownership that the entrepreneur still organizes the firm even though
she receives only a share of the gains."' Cooperatives with smaller
efficiency gains do not get started. If this were the case, cooperatives
as a group would exhibit lower failure rates and higher productivity
measures, precisely what the empirical findings suggest."' But if
cooperatives always started when efficient, their performance as a
group should converge to that of investor-owned firms.
To be sure, cooperatives do not form only when they offer
efficiencies; just as with investor-owned firms, cooperatives can start
when they are ultimately less productive and fail. But the evidence
that cooperatives as a class are more efficient than investor-owned
firms is consistent with barriers to cooperative formation.
3. Persistence of Cooperatives Once Formative Influence Is
Removed
Several agriculture and insurance cooperatives organized at a
time when lax regulation led to market contracting problems that made
cooperative ownership attractive."' Because of today's more rigorous
antitrust enforcement and heightened regulation of insurance
companies, these cooperative advantages have diminished."'
Yet agriculture and property insurance cooperatives that formed
in these historical times continue and expand their operations, often
with efficiencies as good as, or better than, investor-owned
competitors."' Only if there were barriers to initial cooperative
formation could a significant portion of cooperatives' relative
advantage be later eliminated and have the firm remain efficient and
even thrive. That this trend persists over the long term suggests these
companies are not merely the last vestiges of historical circumstances.
Indeed, new cooperatives in these areas still start, although for property
insurance (for which comprehensive data are available) the formation
rate has slowed, which could be expected if the form still offers real,
but diminished, efficiencies.'
175. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
176. See sources cited supm note 174.
177. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 124-25, 271-72, 284-85.
178. Antitrust enforcement reduces the presence of monopolies between buyers and
sellers, while regulation of insurance companies reduces the companies' ability to exploit
asymmetric information and market power.
179. This evidence is most robust with property insurers. See, e.g., Born et al., supra
note 102, at 19 1; Ar Mutual Insurers an EndangeredSpecies?, supra note 174, at 3.
180. Analysis of A.M. Best data shows 32 surviving cooperative property/casualty
insurers founded from 2000 through 2010 compared to 474 investor-owned property/casualty
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However, with life insurance, investor-owned firms have become
more prominent, with several cooperative insurers converting to
investor ownership. "' Regulation's undermining of cooperative
advantages has been particularly impactful here, as has been the
increase in costs from cooperative insurers' restricted access to
capital.182 If enough of a cooperative's advantages are removed at the
same time as costs of cooperative ownership rise, it will become
inefficient, even if it originally had significant benefits. Such is
apparently the case here.'
If there were no barriers to cooperative formation, a significant
portion of cooperatives would be only slightly more efficient than their
investor-owned competitors. Thus, cooperatives as a group should
largely exit the market or convert to investor ownership over the long
term when a large portion of their advantage is removed, since they
would then be less efficient than investor-owned competitor firms.
But this often does not occur. The continuing existence of most
cooperatives in these circumstances suggests they originally required
exceptional benefits sufficient to overcome the barriers to formation.
D AppropnatelyApplying the Evolutionary Theory
Combining theory, observation, and evidence shows that areas of
demonstrated cooperative success cannot rightly be assumed to be the
only areas where cooperatives are comparatively efficient. Dispropor-
tionate barriers to cooperative formation, relative to investor
ownership, prevent cooperatives from achieving dominance in or even
entering markets where they are the superior form of ownership.
Conventional explanations, however, do apply. Survivorship
shows those markets where cooperatives were able to overcome these
barriers, because of high returns to cooperatives, community-oriented
insurers. This rate of cooperative vs. investor-owned creation is far less than their respective
existing market shares, suggesting a modern decrease in their formation rate. See supra Table
1. For life insurance, only two surviving cooperative life/health insurers were started from
2000 through 2010 compared to 199 investor-owned life/health insurers. This rate is also far
less than their respective market shares. See supm Table 1.
181. Am Mutual Insures an Endangewd Species?, supra note 174.
182. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 271-75.
183. Note that the increase of investor-owned firms at cooperatives' expense shows
both the speed at which market pressures select the efficient ownership form when different
types are already present and the success of brokers in promoting efficient investor
ownership-the evolutionary theory at work. Yet the evolutionary theory is applicable here
only because cooperatives and investor-owned firms were simultaneously present and
because competitive forces pushed toward investor ownership, where starting and brokering
firms are not difficult.
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entrepreneurs, or low costs of assembling prospective patron-owners.'"
By extension, there is room for cooperative growth beyond those
industries where they currently appear.
E. Implicadons for Shareholder Primacy
The shareholder primacy model of corporate governance says
that management should respond exclusively to the economic interests
of shareholders.' Its proponents point to the lack of widespread
cooperatives and other ownership forms with diverse owners as
evidence that the ongoing costs-particularly from difficulties in
collective decision making and the resulting management agency
costs-of competing corporate governance methods, such as a
stakeholder model, make them undesirable.' A shareholder primacy
model for corporate governance minimizes these costs and promotes
efficient organizations."' Many of these principles have become
embodied in corporate law today.'
The shareholder primacy model is not without its critics, who
argue that management should also address the interests of other
stakeholders-such as suppliers, workers, customers, or the
community.' These arguments have recently gained traction in social
enterprise, where they have driven states'-including Delaware's-
consideration or adoption of new corporate forms including low-profit
limited liability companies (L3Cs) and benefit corporations. 1"
Stakeholder advocates' critics must grapple with two related problems:
why are few firms owned by stakeholders if doing so would maximize
the firm's returns, and would a stakeholder model result in
184. See supra Part IVC.
185. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End offlstory for Corporte Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
186. Seeid.
187. Seeid.at449.
188. See, eg., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 46 (Del. Ch.
2010) (finding that principals of Craigslist violated corporate law duties by failing to pursue
profit-maximizing opportunities for shareholders). See generally Edward B. Rock, Adapting
to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 1907 (2013) (describing this
change in a corporate law paradigm).
189. Lynn A. Stout, Response, The Toxic Side Effects ofShareholder Prinacy, 161 U.
PA. L. RE. 2003, 2012-19 (2013). See generally LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE
MYTH (2012) (developing these arguments at length); KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGREsSIVE POssIBLmEs (2006) (arguing that
firms should account for stakeholder interests).
190. Dana Brakman Reiser, Theoizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J.
681, 683 (2013). These developments are not without their critics. See, eg., Brian D. Galle,
SocialEnterprise: Who Needs It. 54 B.C. L. RE. 2025 (2013).
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unmanageable decision-making costs or agency costs?"' This Article
supports the stakeholder model in both respects. First, stakeholder-
owned firms like cooperatives might be rare because of barriers to
formation, rather than because of an inability to maximize welfare.
Second, these formation difficulties, rather than collective decision-
making costs and agency costs, could drive the lack of stakeholder-
owned firms like cooperatives. In that case, while these collective
decision-making and agency costs should not be ignored, they need be
neither insurmountable nor the primary reason cooperatives are scarce,
meaning the perceived benefits of shareholder primacy may be
overstated.
E Summary
As was noted at the outset of this Article, ownership structure is
important because it affects all attributes of a firm's process, from the
techniques used by its suppliers, to the way it treats its workers, to the
quality of the products it produces for its consumers, to the prices that
are charged, to the need for costly regulation and oversight.' Society's
goal should therefore be that different methods of ownership are
chosen based solely on relative efficiencies, not on barriers to
formation. When cooperatives are more efficient, investor ownership
should not dominate merely because cooperatives are necessarily more
difficult to organize. But when cooperatives are inefficient, entre-
preneurs should choose an alternative form. In ideal circumstances,
cooperative ownership would be chosen in those circumstances (and
only those circumstances) where the net benefits from cooperative
ownership exceed those of other ownership forms. Removing the
barriers that inhibit cooperatives from forming is an important step
toward achieving this goal. Part V considers how one could begin.
V. SUBSIDIZING COOPERATIVES
If cooperatives are in many cases the better form of ownership,
but face disproportional difficulty in starting, society as a whole-not
just patron-owners---could benefit from more cooperatives in
appropriate circumstances. Subparts A through D develop ways for
fostering the creation of cooperatives. Subpart E then applies these
191. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-BadArguments for Shareholder Prknacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REv. 1189, 1199-1201 (2002).
192. See supm Part III.
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ideas to Congress's new subsidization of health insurance cooperatives
as part of the Affordable Care Act.
A. Genenl Tax or Grant Incentives
The tax system has long been a tool for incentivizing socially
desirable activities. Homeownership receives a tax subsidy arguably
because of the positive spillovers it has on society.'" Nonprofits are
given a host of tax advantages when they provide social benefits. 94
The tax code's potential to incentivize cooperatives is no different.
In important respects, all cooperatives have the same problems
deterring their formation. Individual entrepreneurs lack financial
incentives to start cooperatives or convert firms to cooperatives,
prospective patron familiarity with cooperatives is low, and brokering
processes are scarce and undeveloped. These common problems
suggest the possibility of a common solution through the tax code.
Before considering such a solution, it is worth briefly
highlighting the similarities between this problem and the barriers to
formation that nonprofits face. As with cooperatives, nonprofit entre-
preneurs confront the prospect of low personal financial returns,
because both cooperatives and nonprofits improve welfare in ways the
entrepreneur cannot capture herself. '" And brokered nonprofit
transactions are similarly undeveloped.'96
Nonprofits receive subsidies from the tax code when these
welfare improvements fall into enumerated charitable categories
roughly coinciding with providing goods or services with positive
extemalities.'" These subsidies encourage nonprofits' formation and
ongoing activities separately. Donations and tax-exempt bond
193. See, e.g., Daniel Aaronson, A Note on the Benefits of Homeownershi, 47 J.
URB. EcoN. 356, 357-58 (2000) (exploring these positive spillovers). The subsidy arises
through the nontaxation of homeowners' imputed rental income. See genem/ly LEE ANNE
FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HoME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES 157-58
(2009) (discussing innovative subsidies to effect certain patterns of land use).
194. Exempt nonprofits do not have to pay federal income tax on their net earnings
related to their exempt purpose, while exempt nonprofits that qualify for "charitable" status
receive additional benefits, including deductions to donors for their gifts, eligibility for grants
from private foundations, the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds, and usually, state property tax
exemptions. Peter Molk, Reforming Nonprofit Exemption Requirements 17 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 482-83, 486-87 (2012).
195. Nonprofits are prohibited from distributing profits to controlling individuals, so
that just as with the cooperative, a nonprofit entrepreneur must share profits with other
members or society at large. See Hansmann, supm note 20, at 838 (identifying the
nondistribution constraint).
196. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 294.
197. See Molk, supra note 194, at 488-89.
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issuances help nonprofits start, and their income and state property tax
exemptions encourage ongoing activities. When these tax subsidies
are not enough, the federal government also has given direct grants to
encourage exempt nonprofits to form.'
These principles can be applied to cooperatives. A cooperative
entrepreneur, like a nonprofit entrepreneur, produces positive
externalities. Recognizing that the nature of these positive externalities
varies between exempt charitable nonprofits and cooperatives, I can
nevertheless borrow ideas from nonprofit subsidization and apply
them to cooperatives. The following two Subparts consider
possibilities taken from nonprofits for encouraging initial cooperative
formation.
1. Encouraging Initial Formation Through the Tax Code
This Article has shown that barriers inhibit the spread of efficient
cooperatives. There are several ways to address these barriers. One
appealing method decreases other cooperative costs, such as their cost
of capital. Reducing this cost could help counteract cooperatives'
formation difficulty.
One way of doing so would be to enable cooperatives to issue
tax-exempt bonds. This would lessen cooperatives' debt costs and
decrease the amount of equity they need. Lower equity requirements
make more potential patron-owners able to afford membership and
increase cooperatives' expected returns. Both make it more likely the
cooperative will start in the first place, the first by lowering formation
costs and the second by increasing cooperative profitability and
attractiveness to entrepreneurs. By limiting cooperatives' ability to
issue such bonds to the formation stage only (perhaps making them
available only during the first year of a cooperative's existence), this
subsidy is assured of applying only to cooperative formations, which is
where the barrier lies.
Tax-exempt bonds also increase the likelihood of converting an
existing firm to cooperative ownership, with or without broker
assistance. Converting a successful firm to a cooperative requires
buying out the existing owners' equity, which for a successful firm can
impose onerous buy-in requirements on new patron-owners.'" By
198. For a general listing of government grants encouraging a variety of activities, see
Home, GRANTs.GOv, http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/home.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2014).
199. Perhaps for this reason, Congress has created tax advantages to facilitate worker
buyouts of existing investor-owned firms through Employee Stock Ownership Plans
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making debt financing more attractive, restructurings can substitute
more debt in place of equity and again open membership to more
prospective patron-owners.
Tax-exempt bonds need not be the exclusive tax-based method of
subsidizing cooperative formation. In addition to (or in lieu of) tax-
exempt bonds, another possibility would be to give cooperative
members a deferral on income tax on the first $Xof a cooperative's
profits2" retained by the cooperative for future operations.20' Currently,
owners of cooperatives realize phantom income, where they pay
individual-level tax on their share of the firm's profits today, even
when these profits are not immediately distributed to owners and are
instead retained by the firm to finance future operations.202 Ensuring
that owners receive sufficient distributions to cover this burden is a
limitation on cooperatives' ability to retain earnings and finance initial
operations. As with tax-exempt bonds, limiting the deferral to the
cooperative's early operations ensures the subsidy applies only to the
cooperative's formative period.
During this formative period, if retained earnings were not
taxable to cooperative owners until ultimately distributed as profits, the
result is an effective way of providing cooperatives desired preferential
treatment. Greater expected earnings over a cooperative's lifetime
make the cooperative more attractive to entrepreneurs, spurring their
initial creation. And providing this deferral in the early years of
(ESOPs). One downside, however, is that the requirements of new-worker ownership are
minimal, making many of these transactions a situation where investor-owners maintain
control over the firm while reaping the ESOP tax advantages. How To Establish an ESOP,
ESOP, http://www.esopassociation.org/explore/how-esops-work/learn-about-esops (last visited
Mar. 22, 2014) (discussing tax advantages of ESOPs); HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 105-08
(noting lack of worker control in many ESOPs).
200. A more precise method would tie the deduction to $X times the number of
members, so that cooperatives with more members (and therefore more difficulty in
organizing) could receive a higher exemption ceiling.
201. This subsidy is currently given without limit to credit unions-cooperative
banks-which likely has helped them reach their current level of operations. 26 U.S.C.
§501(c)(14) (2012); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-220T, FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS: ISSUES REGARDING THE TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF CREDIT UNIONS 8 (2005).
202. Donald A. Frederick, Income Tax Treatment of Cooperatives: Distibutions,
Retains, Redemptions, and Patrons' Taxation: Cooperative Information Report 44, Part 3,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RURAL DIv 14-16 (2005), http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/pub/cir443.
pdf. Although rare in practice, cooperatives can instead choose to pay immediate corporate-
level tax on retained earnings and then receive a credit when the retained earnings are later
distributed, at which point they are taxable to the distributees, but in this case too, tax is paid
immediately. Id.; Donald A. Frederick, Tax Treatment of Cooperatives.: Cooperative
Information Report 23, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., RURAL DIV, http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/
pub/cir23/ClR23.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (stating that most cooperatives elect to
have patron-owners pay tax).
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cooperative activities helps the cooperative accumulate capital during
its early years of operation, when capital is often most needed.203
Adjusting X for industry or other factors could ensure the stimulus
applies only to those inframarginal situations where individual
expected returns from organizing the cooperative are too low, rather
than also applying when there are already enough market-based
incentives to organize cooperatives.204
A significant virtue of both tax-exempt bonds and deferral of
income realization is that distortions are minimized from cooperatives'
forming in areas where they are clearly inferior. Both tax-exempt
bonds and a tax deferral on retained earnings are tied to the
cooperative's market performance. An inefficient cooperative entrant
will face not only high borrowing costs as lenders recognize the firm's
poor chances for success, but also low earnings as the firm is not
competitive. Neither tax-exempt bonds nor a delayed realization of
income will be particularly helpful to these cooperatives. Thus, neither
of these subsidies will push much development of inefficient
cooperatives. One downside, though, is that these subsidies do not
directly target the entrepreneur, instead affecting patron-owners
generally. This means subsidies may have to be comparatively large to
have an effect on entrepreneur behavior, since much of their benefit
goes to other owners rather than to the entrepreneur. I next consider
more direct alternatives.
2. Alternatives to the Tax Code
The tax code need not be the exclusive method of subsidizing
cooperatives. In addition to using the tax code, grants, loans, or other
direct subsidies could be provided to entrepreneurs starting
cooperatives. Such support is regularly given to exempt nonprofits205
and, via a mechanism of the Farm Credit System, to certain rural and
agriculture cooperatives." Providing this support to cooperatives
203. See, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 109, at 13, 107 (discussing how undercapi-
talization caused failure of some plywood cooperatives); COOPERATIVE CONVERSIONS,
FAILURES AND RESTRUCTURINGS: CASE STUDIES AND LESSONS FROM U.S. AND CANADIAN
AGRICULTURE, at xiv (Murray Fulton & Brent Hueth eds., 2009), available athttp://www.kis.
usask.ca/COOPSBOOK/CoopConversions BookSep09.pdf (discussing the early lack of
capital as a frequent cause of potentially viable cooperative failures).
204. Condominiums are an area where market-based incentives already appear
sufficient.
205. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (grants).
206. About CoBanl4 COBANK, http://www.cobank.com/About-CoBank.aspx (last
visited Mar. 22, 2014).
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helps overcome initial funding constraints, which makes forming
cooperatives more attractive and reduces required contributions from
new patron-owners, in turn broadening the potential owner pool.
The advantage of grants or loans is twofold. Unlike tax code
subsidies, they provide direct, visible support for starting new
cooperatives and should thereby have an immediate impact on
cooperative formation. They also can be used to encourage
cooperatives in targeted areas where they promise the greatest gains.
This flexibility is also a potential drawback. Since grants or loans are
untethered to the market's disciplinary force, overly generous usage
might induce cooperative formation where cooperatives will likely fail.
Restricting grants and loans to cooperatives' formative stages could
minimize long-term losses from such exuberance.
With both grants and tax subsidies, care must be taken to make
sure firms do not organize as cooperatives in name only for these
subsidies, while having the attributes of investor-owned firms. Since
investor-owned firms lack the organizing difficulties of cooperatives,
subsidizing them would be inappropriate. Luckily, addressing this
problem could be fairly straightforward.207
3. Encouraging Ongoing Operation?
The prior Subparts discussed techniques for financially
encouraging cooperative formation. As this Article has shown, a major
deterrent to cooperatives is their difficulty in formation, so an effective
remedy to this deterrent jump-starts that initial formation. Yet this Part
has drawn comparisons between cooperatives and exempt nonprofits,
the latter of which receive ongoing subsidies through federal income
tax and state property tax exemption in addition to formation stimulus.
Should a similar approach be adopted for cooperatives?208
207. Since the key deterrent to new cooperative formation is sharing surplus with
fellow owners, a starting point would restrict the subsidies to new cooperatives with (1) a
minimum number of members (for example, ten), (2) who share profits based on their
patronage with the firm (amount of supplied input, amount of work performed, or amount of
product purchased for producer, worker, and consumer cooperatives, respectively), and
(3) who allocate voting based on relative patronage or equally across members. The
minimum member requirement is already a factor sometimes used by the I.R.S. in
determining qualification for tax treatment as a cooperative. IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-19-030
(May 8, 1992). Combining these requirements ensures that instances where an entrepreneur
captures much of the profit produced, and therefore does not face a deterrent to organization,
would fall outside these subsidies.
208. Relative to C-corporations, cooperatives already receive preferential treatment
because, without undue difficulty, they can structure their income so it is taxed once,
generally at the individual-member level. 26 U.S.C. § 1382 (2012). But in many circum-
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While both cooperatives and exempt nonprofits have similar
difficulties in formation, there is a key difference between the two.
Exempt nonprofits generally provide an ongoing service with positive
social spillovers that benefit society as a whole,2" but no such
requirement is demanded of cooperatives.210 When activities affect
more than just owners, providing the activity is a two-part problem:
the provider must be encouraged both to organize and to operate. The
ongoing subsidy that exempt nonprofits receive can therefore be seen
as subsidizing operations that would otherwise be underprovided.21'
When the benefits of an activity are largely captured by owners, no
operational subsidy is required to ensure an efficient level of operation
by the firm.
While an ongoing subsidy to cooperative activities would
increase the (discounted) initial profitability of the venture and
encourage cooperative formation, much of the subsidy would leak to
patron-owners, rather than the entrepreneur whose organizing activity
is the one most in need of subsidy, and would therefore be a costly
method of subsidy. Even more disturbingly, an ongoing subsidy could
induce cooperatives to form and remain in markets where they have no
competitive advantage over other ownership forms.212 For these
stances, investor-owned firms, including C-corporations, can attain identical treatment. Most
investor-owned firms, large and small, achieve this result merely by organizing as an
alternative to a C-corporation, such as a limited liability corporation, limited liability
partnership, or S-corporation, all of which allow for income to be taxed only once as long as
the organization is not deemed publicly traded. Id § 7704; RIBSTEIN, supa note 24, at 193-
246. C-corporations, if under $50 million in gross assets, can also achieve single taxation.
26 U.S.C. § 1202(d). See generally Victor Fleischer, Taxng Founders' Stock, 59 UCLA L.
REv. 60, 63-64 (2011) (discussing how entrepreneurs can obtain preferential tax treatment in
investor-owned firms); Victor Fleischer, "Tax Extenders" that Slip Under the Radar, N.Y
TIMEs DEALBOOK (Jan. 15, 2013, 2:47 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/15/tax-
extenders-that-slip-under-the-radar/ (explaining how this tax exemption is applied).
209. This requirement appears in the statutory exemption requirement. 26 U.S.C.
§ 501(c).
210. Although on occasion cooperatives do as well, many times cooperative activities
have only minimal positive externalities beyond those capturable by cooperative members.
211. See generally Molk, suprd note 194, at 480-82 (discussing this justification of
nonprofits' exemption). Consistent with this idea, when nonprofits cease activities with
positive externalities, their exemptions are subject to revocation. Such was the case with
nonprofit health insurers, whose exemptions were revoked as part of a comprehensive tax
reform in 1986, when it was determined they no longer provided a public benefit. H.R. REP.
No. 99-426, at 664 (1985) ("The committee is concerned that exempt charitable and social
welfare organizations that engage in insurance activities are engaged in an activity whose
nature and scope is so inherently commercial that tax exempt status is inappropriate."); 26
U.S.C. § 501(c), (in).
212. See Peter Molk & Arden Rowell, Reregulation and the Regulatory Thelhne (draft
on file with author) (discussing long-term consequences of regulatory policy).
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reasons, individual cooperatives should not be subsidized over longer
time periods, as are exempt nonprofits.
B. Reducmng Reguladon
Independent of financial incentives that help start cooperatives,
certain regulations applying to cooperatives could be eased. Effective
regulation corrects market failures that would otherwise arise. 2'3
Antitrust regulation prevents harmful restraints of trade. 214 A system of
labor laws protects worker interests from employer exploitation."'
Various consumer protection laws keep consumers from being ripped
off by firms. 216
Many cooperatives also offer these same protections to their
owner-members by virtue of their organizational structure. Producer
cooperatives, for example, solve problems of producers being
exploited by a buyer with market power. A firm owned by its workers
lacks incentive to allow unsafe working conditions or to otherwise take
advantage of its worker-owners. And a company owned by its
customers lacks reason to sell them inferior products.
Often, however, regulators do not distinguish among ownership
forms. Insurance companies, for example, are generally subjected to
the same regulatory scrutiny whether they are investor-owned or
owned by their policyholders, despite the latter's structure for
consumer protection.217 Cooperatively owned credit unions are largely
subject to the same regulation as are traditional banks.218 Nor do courts
213. HANSMANN, supra note 12, at 151.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
215. 29 U.S.C. § 1(2012).
216. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 3601 (condominium and cooperative conversion protection
and abuse relief); id. § 6101 (telemarketing fraud and abuse).
217. For example, solvency regulation often does not account for ownership form
despite cooperatively owned insurers' theoretical and demonstrated consumer protection
behavior. See Martin Eling & Ines Holzmilller, An Overview and Comparison ofRisk-Based
Capital Standards, 26 J. INs. REG. 31, 34 (2008) (discussing the RBC formula, which does not
account for ownership structure in the primary form of solvency regulation). But see Capital
and Surplus Requirements for Companies, NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'Rs, http://www.hhs.
gov/cciio/initiative/capital-and-surplus-requirements forcompanies-b webb_508.pdf (last
visited Mar. 22, 2014) (showing some states have additional capital requirements that vary by
ownership form).
218. For example, both credit unions and banks are subject to the same general
regulations. Are Credit Unions Regulated or Supervised by the Federal Reserve System.,
FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F (Mar. 2005), http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-
econ/2005/march/credit-unions-regulation-supervision; Reserve Requirements, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
reservereq.htm (last updated Nov. 5, 2013) (reserve requirements); Comparihg Credit Unions
Kith Other Depository Institudons, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY 5 (Jan. 2001), http://www.
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or juries appear to account for ownership structure in products liability
or consumer fraud cases, again despite cooperatives' lacking motive
for this activity.219 And although worker-owned firms are few,
regulators have shown no tendency to give them any lower oversight.
Recognizing that there is less need to regulate cooperatives that,
by virtue of their structure, protect their patron-owners would save
cooperatives compliance costs and regulators the expense of regulating
cooperatives. Cutting back on these regulations can stimulate
cooperative formation both by reducing regulatory hurdles to
formation and by increasing profitability by saving on regulatory
compliance.
Of course, just because a cooperative lacks the incentive to
exploit individuals does not guarantee that exploitation will not
occur.220 For this reason, regulation of cooperatives should not be
entirely eliminated. But understanding that the protection offered by
regulation can be duplicated by the protection inherent in the
cooperative ownership form offers opportunities to reduce unnecessary
oversight.
C Other Tools
There are a myriad of other ways that cooperative formation
could be stimulated beyond the financial and regulatory methods
outlined here. For example, a policy could be adopted requiring all
firms in a particular industry to be organized as cooperatives. The
danger of such a policy is that it might be applied to industries where
cooperatives fail to offer efficiencies, so that social welfare is reduced
as an inefficient ownership form is adopted. The benefit, of course, is
that it would be very effective at jump-starting formation of
cooperatives.
Intrusive though such a policy might be, it is commonly applied
to the legal and medical professions, where regulations require that
only lawyers and doctors be allowed to own legal and medical
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/report3O7O2.doc ("[Mjost of the remaining
major regulatory differences between credit unions and other depository institutions [have
been] removed.").
219. For example, policyholders regularly bring suit against policyholder-owned
insurance companies for this behavior, yet no references to the ownership structure's
protective mechanism is made. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 925 P.2d
1042 (Alaska 1996).
220. For a particularly prominent example, see State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (upholding a $145 million punitive
damage award against cooperative insurer).
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practices respectively-meaning that law firms and medical practices
must be organized as worker cooperatives.22' Academics have had
difficulty rationalizing these anticompetitive rules.222 However, if the
ongoing benefits from worker ownership exceed those of investor
ownership in these industries, such regulatory intervention could be
welfare-enhancing. Because investor-owned firms start more readily
than cooperatives, if law firms and medical practices were opened up
to investor ownership, there is a risk that investor ownership would
come to dominate, even though it produces lower social benefit than
does cooperative ownership.
There are alternatives to regulatory mandates requiring the
cooperative form. Policies could address the coordination costs that
keep existing firms from converting to cooperatives by, for example,
requiring firms reorganizing in bankruptcy to make a good faith offer
to sell to a group of the firm's patrons.
Or, policies could enhance other preferences to promote
development of social entrepreneurs, who might then be willing to
start cooperatives223 or conduct publicity campaigns extolling the
virtues of cooperatives to reduce the costs of assembling co-owners
and make both start-ups and conversions more likely. Strong
objections have been raised against intentional shaping of individual
values,224 but in many circumstances, some shaping is unavoidable.225
For example, a federal program issuing grants to cooperatives may act
as an implicit endorsement that increases cooperatives' legitimacy in
the public's mind, possibly both enhancing cooperative creation and
spurring other related behavior.226 I take no position on the propriety of
221. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 5.4 (1983); Renee Newman Knake,
Democratizing the Delivery ofLegal Services, 73 OHO ST. L.J. 1, 14-15 (2012); William M.
Sage & David A. Hyman, Combatng Antinicrobial Resistance: Regulatory Strategies and
Institutional Capacity, 84 TuL. L. REv. 781, 804 (2010).
222. See, eg., Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers i the Business ofLaw: Does the
One Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules? 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 655-66 (1989)
(discussing the idea ofnonlawyer owned law firms); Roberta S. Karmel, WillLawFhms Go
Public? (Brooklyn Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Papers, Working Paper Series, Research
Paper No. 321 at 1, 2013), http://ssm.com/abstract-2205709.
223. See Lynn A. Stout, Social Norms and Other-Regarding Preferences, in NORMS
AND THE LAw 13, 32-33 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006) (exploring how to shape preferences).
224. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CI. L. REv 133,
133-34 (2006); Gregory Mitchell, Review Essay, Libetarian Paternalism Isan Oxymoron, 99
Nw. U. L. REv 1245, 1246 (2005).
225. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NuDGE 9-11 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein
& Richard H. Thaler, Libertanian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. C. L. REv. 1159,
1164 (2003).
226. See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting the legitimizing message sent by government's endorsement or
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using these methods to initialize cooperative formation, but only
identify them as potential techniques.
D. How Much To Incentivize?
I now come to the tricky issue of calibrating how much
cooperative subsidy is appropriate. For subsidy through decreased
regulation, regulation should be cut back only in those markets where
cooperatives offer the protection that regulation otherwise affords, and
then only by how much protection the form offers instead of by how
high formation hurdles are. Final calibration can happen through tax-
code subsidy, grants, or other means.
Ideally, cooperatives would be subsidized to the point where
firms choose their organizational structure based only on which is
most efficient, rather than which has the lowest barriers to organization
as often occurs today. This subsidy amount cannot be known ahead of
time, so subsidy rates must be adjusted based on observation over
time. Some guidelines follow.
As cooperatives succeed in a particular industry, the difficulty in
starting one, while still present, diminishes. Demonstrated success not
only makes cooperatives more familiar and legitimate to potential
patrons and entrepreneurs, but also should reduce their perceived start-
up risk and provide models on which future cooperatives could be
patterned. This makes it easier to assemble co-owners and increases
the likelihood that future entrepreneurs and brokers might consider
cooperatives as a viable option. Thus, while support might be
relatively heavy as cooperatives gain critical footing in new industries,
the level of support can be decreased over time as cooperatives
succeed. For example, any support for cooperatives in property
insurance, where cooperatives are already familiar,227 should be less
than the support for cooperatives in health insurance, where
cooperatives currently have no significant presence.
In addition, if more industries develop viable institutions for
brokering cooperative ownership, as has arisen for condominiums,
support could be further reduced. A robust brokering process
effectively solves cooperative formation difficulties. 228 If these
institutions form as cooperatives penetrate new markets, external
support could be withdrawn.
disapproval of a religion); Benartzi, supm note 88, at 1748 (noting that employer allocation of
retirement contributions acts as an endorsement to employees).
227. See sources cited suprd note 99.
228. SeesupmPartIV
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Combining these points gives a general structure for cooperative
support. First, reduce regulation as appropriate. Then, identify areas
where cooperatives can fix market failures, but which currently have
no developed brokering institution. Next, subsidize cooperative
formation in those areas through tax policy, grants, or other means
until a critical mass of cooperatives forms. As cooperatives flourish,
subsidy rates can be reduced, and in those areas where brokering
institutions develop, subsidies can be withdrawn completely.
When structuring this support, it may become apparent that the
costs of subsidizing cooperative formation in certain industries
outweigh the incremental social benefits that cooperatives might
offer.' In those circumstances, the proper approach is to refrain from
subsidizing cooperatives, even if they would be more beneficial once
up and running, because the ongoing benefits do not exceed the cost of
subsidy. Without conducting such a deliberative analysis, however, a
policy like the current approach that generally refuses to subsidize
cooperative formation cannot be supported, given the difficulty
cooperatives have in starting and the lack of viable brokering
institutions.
E An Application: Health Insurance Cooperatives
As part of the Affordable Care Act, Congress made available $2
billion in funding to subsidize the formation of health insurance
cooperatives, as an alternative to a public option.230 While it is too
early to know if these pilot insurers will succeed, it is not too early to
compare briefly the subsidization of these companies with the
strategies outlined earlier in this Part. I develop a fuller analysis
elsewhere."'
Health insurance has several of the characteristics indicative of
cooperative success. Buyers are comparatively small and face a
restricted set of large sellers, giving sellers market power over these
transactions.23 Both buyers and sellers have private information they
229. Some of these benefits will be difficult to quantify precisely. Welfare gains from
nonfinancial ownership motivation or the incremental development of positive externality
goods are two examples. Note in addition that subsidizing cooperatives today may reduce the
costs of doing so in the future, so sizable immediate subsidies may be worthwhile if future
subsidies could be lower such that long-term payoffs are sufficiently large.
230. See supm note 4 and accompanying text.
231. Peter Molk, The Owneahip ofHealth Insers (draft on file with author).
232. Id.
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can use to exploit the other.' Insurers have opportunities to provide
positive externality goods." Capital requirements also are not unduly
high. 235
Consumer familiarity with cooperative health insurers is likely
low, however, since existing cooperative presence in this field is
negligible. "' Further, no brokering institution has developed.
Consequently, Congress gave these cooperatives generous initial
subsidies by exempting cooperative earnings from income tax and by
lending money to them at below-market rates. 2' Given the
unfamiliarity with cooperatives in this market, significant initial
subsidies are not unwarranted to help overcome start-up barriers.
Congress, however, did not exempt the health insurers from
consumer protection regulations or indeed any insurance regulations.238
Exemption from regulations could be desirable if they duplicate the
cooperatives' protective function.' Congress's income tax exemption
for insurers' earnings also appears to be perpetual, rather than
temporary, despite the fact that most services provided by these
insurers will accrue directly to policyholder-owners, rather than society
at large, and so need not be subsidized on an ongoing basis like exempt
nonprofits' ongoing activity.240 This perpetual subsidy raises the
possibility that these cooperatives may persist over the long term even
if they are inefficient. While the idea of subsidizing these insurers may
have been appropriate, the ways Congress chose to do so were not.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given their demonstrated potential for maximizing benefits of
ownership, the lack of cooperatives in the modern economy is
puzzling. Existing theories about the costs and benefits of cooperative
ownership explain when a cooperative will succeed once up and
233. For instance, buyers have private information about their susceptibility to certain
medical conditions, while sellers know which and how much of a particular treatment they
will approve, the particulars of which are not disclosed in the insuring agreement.
234. For example, an insurer cannot exclude a policyholder's future insurers (or society
at large) from enjoying lower future health expenses that vaccinating a policyholder today
might bring.
235. The health insurer generally acts as an intermediary between the customer and
the medical provider and need not provide any capital-intensive activities of its own.
236. See supm note 170 and accompanying text.
237. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1322, 124
Stat. 119, 187 (2010); 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(27) (2012).
238. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1322.
239. Id. §§ 1322(c)(5), 1324.
240. See sources cited supm note 194.
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running, but they do not account for the barriers that inhibit initial
cooperative formation. This Article identifies this problem while
offering suggestions for fixing it.
Because ownership of enterprise is disproportionately held by
less-efficient investor-owned firms, policies that promote cooperative
ownership stand to improve welfare by solving market imperfections,
supplying more positive externality goods, decreasing prices,
increasing product and service quality, and reducing the need for costly
regulations and oversight. These benefits spill over into broader
society, making cooperatives worthy of support.
